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This thesis provides the US Special Operations Command
(USSOCOM) technology base manager with an unclassified reference
document on the Army's "Soldier System," the collective term for
the Army's emerging approach to the research, development and
acquisition of items used by the individual soldier on the
battlefield. Chapters II - IV outline the emerging approach,
discussing the Soldier Modernization Plan, the current Army
acquisition structure and process, and the Army Science Board
"Soldier as a System" study. Chapter V discusses the acquisition
responsibilities of USSOCOM, detailing the evolving relationship
with the Army requirement development process for individual
soldier items. Chapter VI summarizes the thesis findings, assesses
the next steps, and makes specific recommendations to USSOCOM.
The principal conclusion is that maintaining concurrent and
reinforcing combat development, technology base, and top-level
program management interface channels with the Soldier System is
the most effective way for USSOCOM to influence the Army's process
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The goal of those supporting the Soldier System concept is to
apply the proven Department of Defense "systems approach" to the
acquisition of items used by the individual soldier. For the most
committed advocates, this means elevating the process of equipping
single soldiers to that used for major weapon systems.
The justification for this begins with the observation that
individuals do not just "operate" military hardware - in some
instances, they themselves constitute the weapon system. In the
past, this has certainly been true for the combat infantryman. But
it has been often argued, especially by critics of the Soldier
System plan, that modern war has reduced the importance of
infantry. More and more, combat power comes from software upgrades
of stand-off projectiles and the platforms that carry them. In the
current climate of deep defense cuts, many critics of the Army's
Soldier System initiative contend, the Soldier System is a thinly
disguised attempt by the advocates of the affected laboratories and
programs to preserve their budgets and jobs, and is not justified
by the relatively small dollar volume of the programs involved.
Soldier System advocates counter with two arguments. First,
real modern war - meaning the next war, not the last - may mean no
such thing. If the next war is of the Low Intensity type, where
high-tech destructive capability cannot be brought effectively to
bear, then victory will again depend more on the individual. If
"combat" is to be hostage rescues, UN peacekeeping, and drug raids,
then individual ability is more important than ever. Nowhere is
this notion of individual as a weapon stronger than in the combat
special operations forces - Green Berets, Seals, and Rangers - that
form the core of United States Low Intensity Conflict (LIC)
capability
.
Second, regardless of the nature of the next conflict, the
technology surrounding items of individual equipment is becoming
ever more complex and expensive. Some "leap-ahead" innovations are
coming onto the market. The management organization and process
developed to buy leather boots, wool jackets and steel helmets is
not sufficient to acquire micro-climate controlled body armor,
helmets with integrated weapon sights, night vision, global
positioning, neuro-sensors and individual radios, and "skin-in"
performance enhancement and preventive medicine. Nor can it
realistically be expected to nurture the technology base underlying
these developments. To expect the current system to accomplish
these tasks is to invite cost overruns, schedule delays and
performance shortfalls. Indeed, the disjointed system currently in
place may even discourage innovation. It certainly inhibits proper
integration of all the items issued to today's soldiers.
The current defense budget climate, furthermore, should be seen
as a mandate for change, to make the process work better. Many
capabilities might not ever be affordable without the savings
accrued from a more streamlined acquisition process. Finally,
Soldier System proponents contend that if all of the funds
currently programmed for the acquisition of items encompassed by
the Soldier System were centrally budgeted, the total dollar amount
would make it a Major System under Department of Defense acquisi-
tion regulations. To do nothing, in any case, is to eventually
fall behind.
Over the last two years, the senior Army leadership has taken
several steps to sort out these arguments. The Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) , after a series of technology based war
games and simulations, established a Systems Manager (TSM) to
facilitate and coordinate the development of the planning documen-
tation necessary to pursue the Soldier System concept. Various
laboratories in the technology base have developed prototype
technology demonstrators to evaluate some of the more promising
capabilities. The Army Material Command (AMC) conducted a
Technical Area Assessment of the technology base to determine the
current level of progress. The Chief of Staff commissioned an Army
Science Board Summer Study to analyze the situation and make
recommendations. All have recommended pursuing the concept.
Within the Army, a decision point is at hand.
Within the special operations community, these developments
have been watched with interest . The United States Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM) - the new joint, unified organization
with the final responsibility for acquiring equipment for special
operations forces - has two concerns. The first is that the Army
will do too little. If the systematic modernization of weapons and
equipment used by the individual soldier is not realistically
pursued within the Army, then valid USSOCOM requirements will have
to be met through other channels . This possibility has disturbing
POM implications for USSOCOM.
A second and more subtle concern is that after the Soldier
System management concept has been approved in some form by the
Army, programmatic trade-offs will have to be made between the two
arguments favoring the Soldier System outlined above. The fear is
that the low volume, unique needs of the relatively few special
operations soldiers will be lost in Army's pursuit of affordable
equipment to meet the needs of the still much larger "conventional"
Army. If this fear is realized, then the intent of the special
acquisition authority given to USSOCOM by Congress - one of the
most basic reasons for USSOCOM' s existence - will have been
circumvented
.
This thesis was originally sponsored by USSOCOM to investigate
this latter concern and to identify the "interfaces" with the new
Soldier System where USSOCOM could effectively input special
operations requirements into the Army's modernization plans. Two
developments over the course of thesis research have lessened the
immediacy of this fear.
First, Soldier System advocates and managers in the Army -
understanding that special operations requirements exert the
strongest user technological "pull" on the system, that the highly
specialized small unit organization of these forces forms an ideal
test-bed, and that Congress is still perceived to be favorably
disposed towards USSOCOM - have welcomed special operations input
at every level. At the same time, a systematic requirements
development process is emerging within USSOCOM. Currently, there
is no interface "problem."
Second, the complexity of the current defense budget debate has
slowed the decision process in the Army. A program management
office under a general officer (PM-Soldier) to take the Soldier
System from the technology base to fielded equipment was originally
to have been activated in August 1991. Final approval of this step
has been postponed until at least March 1992.
This thesis, therefore, presents a "snapshot" of the Soldier
System. The general conclusion is that the Army is on the right
track and ought to follow through with the management plan even
though some of the capabilities promised by the technology base
community may not be realized. USSOCOM has a very good opportunity
to leverage a relatively large amount of Army funds to develop
equipment required by special operations forces. The most effec-
tive way for USSOCOM to accomplish this is to maintain concurrent
and reinforcing combat development, technology base, and top-level
program management interface channels with the Soldier System.
B . OBJECTIVE
The objective of this thesis is to provide the USSOCOM
technology base program manager with an unclassified reference
document on the Army's Soldier System. The concluding section
provides analysis and recommendations for USSOCOM consideration.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question is: What is the Soldier System
and how does it affect USSOCOM?
Subsidiary research questions are:
• What is the systems approach to acquiring items for use by the
individual soldier, and what benefits does it offer? What is
included in the Soldier System?
• What is the current level of the technology base for individu-
al soldier items? What are the major technologies, programs
and organizations that constitute this base? What are the
major funding profiles?
• What is the current Army management organization and process
for acquisition of items encompassed by the Soldier System
concept? What has the Army done to assess and improve the
effectiveness of this process?
• What are the major findings and recommendations of Army
studies of the Soldier System concept and technology base?
What are the proposed changes?
• What is the USSOCOM acquisition authority and process?
• What are the goals, intent, organization and strategy of
USSOCOM acquisition?
• What is the legal basis of the interface between the Army and
USSOCOM?
• What are the current USSOCOM interfaces with the Soldier
System?
• Are the current Army-USSOCOM interfaces sufficient to effec-
tively communicate special operations requirements to the
current Army organization? To the proposed organization?
• How might USSOCOM improve the process of acquiring individual
soldier items?
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
The scope of this thesis, as outlined in the introduction, is
the changing Army approach to managing the research, development,
and acquisition of items worn and carried by soldiers for personal
use in combat, and the implications for USSOCOM. The major factors
limiting the research effort are the tremendous amount of uncer-
tainty currently surrounding the Army's size and budget and the
impact of the pending changes to the Army's acquisition management
structure. A minor limiting factor is the current disjointed
method of resourcing the many programs and projects involved.
Although many Soldier System programs are stable, the large number
of related small projects by the various laboratories involved has
made monitoring the status of each component of the total Soldier
System difficult
.
The major assumption in this thesis is that the reader is
familiar with the major tenants and policies of Defense acquisi-
tion, but is otherwise unfamiliar with the Soldier System and
USSOCOM.
E. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY
Information presented in this thesis was gathered during visits
to the more significant organizations involved, interviews with
senior managers, command briefings, organizational memoranda of
record, and a review of Army, DoD, and USSOCOM regulations. There
is little published material on this subject.
F. ORGANIZATION
Chapters II-IV discuss the Soldier System concept. Chapter II
provides general background information - the systems concept is
defined, the Soldier Modernization Plan (SMP) is discussed in
detail, and the current Army soldier item technology base outlined.
Chapter III outlines the current Army acquisition management
structure and process relevant to the Soldier System. Chapter IV
presents the conclusions of the Army Science Board's Summer Study.
Chapter V summarizes the organization, interests, and acquisi-
tion strategy of USSOCOM. The current Army-USSOCOM requirement
development and technology base interfaces are noted here.
Chapter VI presents the thesis conclusions, including specific
findings, analysis of future prospects, and specific recommenda-
tions for USSOCOM consideration.
II. SOLDIER MODERNIZATION
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of the Soldier Modernization Plan (SMP) is to
provide a comprehensive plan to modernize the soldier as a
battlefield system. It is one of the 18 Army Coordinated Modern-
ization Plans. The plan covers the full range of research,
development and acquisition from technology base to systems
development to the fielding of soldier items between 1991-2006. In
the SMP, all items that the soldier wears, carries, or consumes on
the battlefield are considered interrelated and assessed for impact
on combat capabilities in five areas - lethality, command and
control, survivability, sustainment, and mobility. A sixth area,
medical, has been included in the technology base parts of the
plan.
The SMP explicitly assumes the "Soldier System" concept as the
basic strategy: the modernization effort is designed to fully draw
on the expertise and advances related to these six capabilities
from all sources within the Army, the other services, allies, and
industry to provide state of the art technologies, and then to
integrate these to produce a system with synergistic improvement in
combat effectiveness. Although the current version of the plan
focuses primarily on the dismounted soldier, vehicle crewmen (both
air and ground) , along with the capabilities required to support
the soldier, such as field and health services, are to receive
greater emphasis in the next update. [Ref. l:p. 75]
The plan outlines four phases: Current (FY92) , Near Term (FY93-
94), Mid Term (FY95-98) , and Far Term (FY99-2006) , although each
component system is defined as either a Next Generation System
(Block I) or a Future System (Block II). [Ref. 2:p. 4.1-4.5, p.
6.5-6.6] Next Generation systems and capabilities are basically
those programs scheduled for fielding in the Mid Term. Future
Systems are those still in Milestone 0, supported by 6.1 and 6.2
dollars, and not scheduled for fielding in current Army long range
plans. It is very important to note that the SMP is not just a
material document - training and doctrine development are addressed
in connection with each capability and system.
The SMP, furthermore, recommends a program management reorgani-
zation similar to that proposed in the Army Science Board study
(Chapter VI) . The plan is currently being used to develop the
baseline documents for the programs encompassed by the system
definition and has been integrated into the various other Army
master planning documents. As this thesis is written, the SMP is
still being revised for signature by the Chief of Staff and
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and
Acquisition (ASARDA)
.
This chapter has five parts. Parts B (Systems Approach) and C
(Army Modernization) provide background information defining the
"systems approach" and role of Army modernization plans. Part D
(SMP Programs) outlines the current items being fielded, the next
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generation systems with supporting Advanced Technology Transition
Demonstrators (ATTD) and major technology demonstrations, and
future systems covered in the SMP . Part E (Funding) gives the
current funding levels. Part F (SMP Status and Recommendations)
summarizes the SMP recommendations and current status . Appendix A
(Acquisition "Roadmap") and Appendix B (SMP Organization and
Proponents) are attached for reference.
B. SYSTEMS APPROACH
1 . Definition
The experience of recent decades indicates that properly
coordinated and functioning man-made systems require the applica-
tion of a well integrated "systems" approach to minimize undesir-
able side effects. This is the implicit assumption underlying the
integrated management framework for Defense Acquisition outlined in
DoD 5000.1. The "effective interaction" of the three major DoD
acquisition decision support systems - Requirements Generation;
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting (PPBS) ; and Acquisition
Management - are "essential for success." [Ref. 17 :p 2-1]
Furthermore, the intent of the "design evolution" process,
described as the focus of acquisition management, is to develop an
affordable "stable system design" that meets a valid operational
requirement. [Ref. 17 :p. 2-6]
A "system" in this design sense is an "assemblage of
elements" forming and operating as a "complex whole." [Ref. 18: p.
1] In practice, this means that all aspects of a product being
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developed must be considered together - from the identification of
a need for an item, to funding its development and fielding, life
cycle costs and logistic support, design and manufacture, user
interface and training, testing, tactics governing its use, and,
most difficult of all, its interface with other systems.
Public law and Government regulations and policy mandate
this. According to Title 10, US Code, Section 2302(5) "Defini-
tions: Major Systems," a "Major System" within the DoD is any
system estimated to eventually cost $115m in FY1990 constant
dollars for research, test, development, and evaluation, or $540m
for procurement. [Ref. 19 :p. 3] All others are "Nonma jor" . [Ref.
19 :p. 3] Each type must adhere to specific management organization
and control policies outlined in DoD 5000.1 and 5000.2.
2 . Traditional Approach to Soldier Items
This "systems approach, " however, has traditionally not
been fully applied to the development and procurement of items
worn, carried and consumed by individual soldiers in the field. In
some instances, the acquisition process of certain items - uniforms
and boots, for example - predate current practices. In a few other
cases, valid needs can be met with only minor modifications to
items readily available on the commercial market. Work gloves,
flashlights, ski's, knives, handguns, and rucksacks are among such
examples. In most all cases, the relatively small dollar value and
"low technology" simplicity of each item - considered in isolation
from all the other items - have allowed development and procurement
to occur outside of the major system framework.
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Funding, likewise, has traditionally been disjointed,
spread across many organizations from different appropriations
accounts and generally without any centralized accounting or
control. In general, "systems integration" has been left to the
individual soldier.
Collectively, however, this disjointed approach has led to
some significant shortcomings. The current Nuclear-Biological-
Chemical (NBC) protective mask does not allow a soldier to use the
sights on the Ml 6 rifle. The Kevlar helmet cannot be worn together
with the cold weather parka hood. The helmet developed for combat
vehicle crewmen does not allow the soldier to wear the issue laser
protective goggles, and the helmet's electronics were found to be
incompatible with the intercom systems in many vehicles. The NBC
protective gloves are too stiff to allow certain radios to be
accurately tuned. Load bearing equipment cannot be worn over the
ballistic vest ("flack jacket") or in many armored vehicles. [Ref.
15]
3 . Emerging Approach - Next Steps
Much more worrisome, however, are the larger integration
problems looming on the horizon, as the technological complexity
and costs of individual soldier items increase. Cost, schedule and
performance risks are all rising. The mix of organizations and
processes traditionally charged with managing the acquisition of
these items, many believe, is simply insufficient for the task.
The solution, it is being argued, is to elevate the concern for
soldier items to the equivalent status of a major weapon system -
13
to designate the "Soldier System" as a Major System in accordance
with DoD 5000.1 and 5000.2.
The Soldier Modernization Plan (SMP) is a large step in
this direction. To understand this, however, it is necessary first




The Army views modernization in terms of warfighting
"capabilities." The development and implementation of doctrine,
organizations, and leadership and training programs that enhance
the Army' s ability to win wars are considered equally with the
development and fielding of weapons and the associated concern for
the production and technology base. "During the coming period of
declining resources, the Army cannot afford to satisfy every
requirement with a new weapon system." [Ref. l:p. 67]
The long term focus must be to "pursue future modernization
sufficient to ensure our smaller Army has the lethality essential
for victory on tomorrow' s battlefield" by selecting systems that
take advantage of all of the Army's strengths (well trained
soldiers and leaders as well as technology) and exploit the
weaknesses of potential adversaries. [Ref. l:p. 67] "To sustain
this long term focus, we must actively manage risk in the near and
mid-term. We will accomplish this by concentrating on the
deployability and staying power of our forces, upgrading systems
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where high payoff in operational or support and personnel savings
is evident, and by terminating programs that provide marginal
improvements in warfighting or sustainability or are determined to
be unaffordable . " [Ref. l:p. 68]
2 . Strategy and Modernization Plans
Five principles have been established to guide all Army
modernization [Ref. 3:pp. 61-62]:
• Field new equipment in priority, beginning with
units that are first to fight.
• Field advanced warfighting capabilities before
potential adversaries.
• Design equipment for future modernization.
• Modernize by force "package" (i.e., field the combination of
new systems, doctrine, organization and training together
rather than piecemeal to the receiving units)
.
• Design, build, and distribute equipment to optimize
readiness and training.
To implement this strategy, the Army has developed an Army
Technology Base Master Plan and 18 "Modernization Plans." Each
modernization plan serves four basic system integration functions.
First is to establish a firm and clear link between technology and
user requirements. Second is to integrate these links into the
PPBS process . Third is to provide specific guidance to the actual
material developer articulating these requirements and the
resources available. Fourth is to provide the necessary guidance
to the developers of doctrine, tactics and force structure.
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Thus, each modernization plan is based on mission and
functional area requirements and includes provisions for three main
concerns: equipment life cycle, force structure, and training and
doctrine development. [Ref. l:p. 68] Each plan encompasses all
systems or families of systems with similar combat functions (e.g.,
armored forces, intelligence, fire support, etc.), sets program
priorities, promotes integration and commonality of effort within
all of the battlefield functional areas, and covers the Total Army
over the next 20-30 years. [Ref. l:p. 69] Each plan is updated
annually to reflect external factors, such as changing threats,
technological breakthroughs or delays, revised funding or personnel
levels, and evolving Army missions. "Consequently, the plans
incorporate the integration of new systems, product improvements to
existing equipment, and procurement of nondevelopmental items."
[Ref. l:p. 69]
Modernization plans are developed jointly by the TRADOC,
AMC, and the various Army laboratories for approval by the Chief of
Staff and Secretary of the Army. The Army Acquisition Executive -
the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development and
Acquisition (ASARDA) - is the supervisory office for actual
material systems modernization.
The Soldier Modernization Plan is the newest of the Army
Modernization Plans, originally scheduled for completion in FY 91.
Its purpose is to improve the capabilities of the soldier by means
of a "systematic, integrated plan that addresses long-term
requirements, priorities, and funding." [Ref. l:p. 75] The plan
16
encompasses all items "worn, carried, or consumed by the soldier in
the field." [Ref. 2:p. 1.1]
D. SMP PROGRAMS
1 . General Overview
The original draft of the SMP focused on 28 tasks in the
area of small arms and munitions, clothing and individual equipment
(CIE) , communications and navigation aids, and food and shelter of
direct concern to the "light" (dismounted) soldier. [Ref. l:p. 75]
Each was previously autonomously pursued within the Program
Executive Officer (PEO) and Army Material Command (AMC) program
management and technology base management structure. [Ref. 4] The
current draft is being expanded to include medical items, especial-
ly NBC, the needs of vehicle crewmen and other soldiers, and the
large number of capabilities required to support the soldier, such
as field services (messing, laundry, and baths) and health
services. [Ref. 5]
Additionally, the plan is establishing priorities and other
guidance for the implementation of the Congressionally mandated
Soldier Enhancement Program (SEP) . [Ref. 5] The SEP is intended to
increase the lethality of infantry weapons, improve the living
conditions of soldiers in the field, and correct deficiencies
identified during Desert Shield/Desert Storm by streamlining the
development cycle and the process for fielding selected non-
developmental ("off-the-shelf") items. [Ref. 6:p. 1]
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Actual hardware in the SMP is divided into three catego-
ries : items currently being fielded; the Next Generation systems
with supporting Advance Technology Transition Demonstrators (ATTDs)
and major technical capability demonstration projects; and Future
Systems. Appendix A (Acquisition Roadmap) graphically shows the
relationships between the various Next Generation and Future
Systems
.
2 . Current Systems
Items currently being introduced for individual equipment
issue to Army soldiers were developed and funded before the Soldier
Modernization Plan was written. [Ref . 5] Significant examples
include the new flame retardant undergarments for armor crewmen,
the five man shelter/sleeping system, the new wet-weather and cold-
weather suites, the expanded ration menu, the improved vehicle
intercom, laser eye protection, and the M4 Carbine. [Ref. 7] Many
other new and relatively less costly items (e.g., the new flash-
light, water resistent socks, pocket knifes, and 40mm grenade) are
part of the Soldier Enhancement Program (SEP) . [Ref. 8] Although
items currently being delivered to the field are largely outside of
the SMP framework, these items are included in the plan to allow
the SMP to serve as a comprehensive subject reference, to establish
clearer priorities for SEP, and to provide a baseline for future
updates of the plan. [Ref. 5]
3 . Next Generation Systems
The greatest focus of the SMP is on the eight Next Genera-
tion Systems, referred to collectively as the Block I Soldier, and
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the large number of previously disjointed ATTDs and technology
capability projects that need to be successfully integrated to
field a true Soldier System. According to the Army Material
Command (AMC) Technolgy Base Assessment, the SMP Block I Soldier
makes use of advances in nine of the congressionally identified
Base Technology Areas: Lightweight Power; Exoskeletal Structures;
Modeling and Simulation; Miniaturization of Electronics; Advance
Materials; Biotechnology; Neuroscience; Artificial Intelligence;
and Robotics. [Ref. 9]
The eight Next Generation Systems are [Ref. 2:p. F-3]
:
The Enhanced Integrated Soldier System (TEISS)
Advanced Integrated Man-Portable System (AIMS)
The Objective Individual Combat Weapon (OICW)
The High Speed Mass Assault Airdrop System
The Joint Family of Operational Rations
Individual Training System
NBC Individual Protection System
NBC Decontamination System
The Block I Soldier, considered as a major system, is
currently programmed for Engineering and Manufacturing Development
and initial Production and Deployment during FY 94-98, although
some elements may be pushed back beyond 2000. [Ref. 7]
The "cornerstone" of TEISS is the Soldier Integrated
Protective Ensemble (SIPE) program managed by the Natick Research,
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Development and Engineering Center (NRDEC) . [Ref. 5] SIPE is a
three year (FY 92-94) $10m ATTD to provide proof of principle of
the thesis, "The Soldier is a System." [Ref. 10] The SIPE program
currently pools research and funding from TRADOC, the Armaments
Research Development and Engineering Center (ARDEC) , the Human
Engineering Laboratory (HEL) , the Center for Night Vision and
Electro-Optics (CNVEO) , the Chemical Research, Development, and
Engineering Center (CRDEC) , and the Communications and Electronics
Command (CECOM) . [Ref. 10] TEISS will integrate the contributions
of other research into SIPE's eight "modules" (sub-systems) [Ref.
10] :
• Clothing & Individual Equipment (CIE) (Uniform, Footwear,
Handwear)
• Ballistic (Helmet, Torso Armor, Facepiece)
• C4I (Computer, GPS, Compass, Software)
• Electro-Optics (Image Intensifier, CCD Camera, Displays, and
Thermal Sights)
• Chem-Biological (Respiratory Device/Filter, Detection
Sensors)
• Microclimate/Power (Blower, Filter, Power, Air Distribution)
• Load Bearing Equipment (Harness/Belt, Packs)
• Weapon (Individual Weapon and Ammunition)
TEISS will enter Phase II (Engineering and Manufacturing
Development) in FY 94-97, with some modules fielded by FY 98. [Ref.
2:p. 6.5] Concept Demonstration and Validation will continue on
all eight modules in two follow-on SIPE programs: Crew SIPE
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(Air) and Crew SIPE (Ground) . [Ref . 9:pp. II-K-3 - 5] The intent
of the modular approach is to allow greater flexibility in the
fielding plan, and, after fielding, to allow tactical commanders to
choose the modules required for specific missions. [Ref. 11]
In addition to medical, nutritional, and field services
research and development, discussed below, other significant
programs to be integrated into TEISS include the Soldier C3
Demonstration, Dismounted Future Combat Soldier System, and Head
Mounted Thermal Imaging Project. [Ref. 9:pp. II-K-4 - 6]
The Objective Individual Combat Weapon (OICW) is part of
the Objective Family of Small Arms Project, currently managed by
the Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center (ARDEC)
.
In addition to OICW, the long range small arms program is supported
by two other technology demonstration projects - the Objective
Proposal Defense Weapon (OPDW) and Objective Crew Served Weapon
(OCSW) . [Ref. 9:p. II-K-3a]
The High Speed Low Altitude Personnel Airdrop Program and
Advanced Aerial Insertion System are the current evolution of the
long-standing research program into parachute technology by NRDEC
[Ref. 5] . Cargo Airdrop, part of the same research project, is not
included in the Soldier System.
The Joint Family of Operational Rations, being developed by
the US Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine (USARIEM)
,
consists of the Assault Ration, Individual Field Ration, and Group
Feeding Programs. [Ref. 12]
21
The two NBC systems are products of the System of Medical,
Chemical and Biological Defense, one of the four medical systems in
the Surgeon General's Health Service Modernization Plan that must
be integrated into the Soldier System. The other three are the
System of Medical Defense Against Infectious Diseases, the System
of Combat Casualty Care, and the System of Soldier Protection,
Sustainment and Enhancement.
The System of Medical Defense Against Infectious Diseases
is the program overseeing all Army research into vaccines. The
System of Combat Casualty Care is a collection of programs seeking
to enhance casualty return-to-duty rates, primarily through
developing expert computer systems for triage and diagnosis at
battalion aid stations, and neuroscience research for improved
treatment of psychiatric casualties. The System of Soldier
Protection, Sustainment, and Enhancement is an on going research
program to develop products to reduce performance degradation
caused by the actual military environment - such as temperature and
altitude extremes, reduced sleep, overpressure and vibration, toxic
chemical by-products of weapons, exposure to directed energy
weapons, and personal hydration and dietary supplements. [Ref. 9:p.
II-K-3a]
The 14 research projects currently contained in the Army
Technology Base Master Plan for medical systems that are directly
related to research for the Soldier System illustrate the broad
scope of this area: Laser Protective Eyewear, Non-Refrigerated
Blood Substitutes, Cyanide Pretreatment, Liposome Delivery Vaccines
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and Drugs, Water Quality Analysis Kit, Head Injury Therapeutic
Technology, Endotoxin Detection, Auxotrophic Mutant Vaccine
Vectors, Mouse-Human Chimeric Antibodies, Non-Toxic Broad Spectrum
Kit, Protosome Complex Vaccines, Chimeric RNA Vaccines, and Neural
Network Software Demonstration to Analyze Lung Injury. [Ref . 9:p.
II-K-3a]
4 . Future Systems
Also known as Block II, these are Phase (Concept Explora-
tion and Definition) programs anticipated to be ready for fielding
in FY 98-2006 and beyond. [Ref. 5] As currently programmed, these
include the Future Combat Soldier System (currently unfunded) / the
Rapid Deployment Food Service Systems; the Combat Field Feeding
Army 21; Advanced Aerial Insertion System, and the future NBC
Individual Protection System and NBC Decontamination System. [Ref.
9:p. II-K-3a]
E. SOLDIER SYSTEM FUNDING
1
. General Overview
At least three major attempts have been made over the last
18 months to calculate the total amount of dollars currently
programmed for research, development and acquisition of items used
by the individual soldier on the battlefield. Each attempt has
reached a different conclusion, although each total classifies the
Soldier System as a Major System. The reasons for the difficulty
in assessing current Soldier System funding levels are discussed
below, followed by the results of the three studies
.
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2 . Funding Assessment Problems
Funds for research, development and acquisition are divided
into four categories - 6.1 (Basic Research), 6.2 (Exploratory
Development), 6 . 3A and 6 . 3B (Advanced Development), and 6.4
(Engineering Development) - but are allocated by Program Element
(PE) . Each PE is subdivided into projects composed of different
"Work Packages." For example, PE 64713 (Combat Feeding, Clothing,
and Equipment) is comprised of four projects: DC40 (Unit and
Organizational Equipment) , DL40 (Clothing and Equipment) , D548
(Military Subsistence Systems) and D668 (Soldier Enhancement
Program) . The Soldier Enhancement Program (SEP) , in turn, for
example, contains 32 different work packages, ranging from weapons,
CIE, food, and compasses. [Ref. 2:p. G-l]
Funds intended for soldier modernization have traditionally
been controlled by the various PEOs and PEO controlled Program
Managers (PMs) , AMC PMs, and Engineering Centers within the Army
acquisition process. Each PEO, PM and Engineering Center has the
latitude to move funds between work packages and projects within
their purview. [Ref. 2:p. G-l]
This system of funding has made it difficult to assess
total funding for soldier modernization for five reasons
.
First, the management of funds for the soldier system is
not yet centralized into one organization - the current calcula-
tions of levels of expenditure are based on "snapshots" of
information provided by the many PEOs, AMC PMs and Engineering
Centers involved. [Ref. 4] Because of the overlap of research
24
areas and desired application of the same research result to many
different systems, it is especially difficult to earmark basic
research dollars against a specific system.
Second, the current expansion of the SMP to cover individu-
al soldier specific medical and NBC research and development, crew
and other soldiers, and field and health services, has made the
accounting task more difficult. [Ref. 4] It has not yet been
sorted out
.
Third, the current budget climate has caused further
uncertainty and decreased program stability.
Fourth, on top of the system described above, research,
development and acquisition resources come out of many different
appropriation accounts. [Ref. 2:p. G-l] Each appropriation has
different laws which govern the use of those specific funds . The
actual purchase of most items now included in the soldier system
has traditionally come out of four appropriations: OMA, OPA-3, OPA-
2, and WCTV. [Ref. 2:p. G-l] Clothing and Individual Equipment
(CIE) , as well as other low dollar value ($15,000 and below),
expendable, non-centrally managed and reportable items, have
previously come out of Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA)
.
[Ref. 2:p. G-l]
Other Procurement, Army-3 (OPA-3) , an element by element
congressionally approved appropriation, is normally used for higher
dollar value, centrally managed investment type items, but is also
currently the source of funds for other items, including the NBC
Individual Protection System. [Ref. 2:p. G-l] Command and control
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items, likewise, including those now part of the soldier system,
are funded out of Other Procurement, Army-2 (OPA-2) , an account
very similar to OPA-3 . [Ref. 2:p. G-l] The funds for individual
soldier weapons are currently contained in the Weapons, Combat
Tracked, Wheel Vehicles (WCTV) account. [Ref. 2:p. G-l] Ammuni-
tion is purchased through a separate ammunition appropriation.
[Ref. 2:p. G-5]
Finally, the program elements developed for last year's
budget request (and used in Annex G) were defined prior to the
development of the current SMP . Thus, they are often not in sync
with specific soldier system work packages defined elsewhere in the
modernization plan. [Ref. 2:p. G-2]
3 . Funding Assessments
As a consequence of the five problems discussed above, the
AMC Soldier System Technology Area Assessment, the Army Science
Board Soldier System study, and the funding annex (written by AMC)
of the SMP, each calculated total funding by slightly different
criteria. The bottom lines of each, therefor, vary significantly.
A snapshot of each is presented here.
Tables 2-1 and 2-2 show the total life cycle profile
presented in the AMC Technology Base Assessment. This profile does
not include any medical (the most difficult to attribute directly
to the soldier system) , field or health-service RD&A and procure-
ment expenditures. [Ref. 14]
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Table 2-1: SOLDIER SYSTEM PROCUREMENT FUNDING (AMC)
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The ASB reported that total Soldier System funding -
excluding SEP, medical, and field and health services - is
estimated to be $278m for Army RDT&E for FY 92-99, and $347m for
FY 00-08. [Ref. 15] Procurement costs are programmed for $718m
for the near and mid-term, and $2. 255b for FY 00-08. [Ref. 15]
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Annual Soldier System related Medical RDT&E is currently projected
to fluxuate between $127m and $145m through FY 97. [Ref. 16]
Soldier System dollar resources currently listed in the SMP
are divided into two funding categories - technology base (6.2 and
6 . 3A) and "System Funding" (6.3B and 6.4) - and totaled by
capability area. Two capability areas, mobility and sustainment,
however, have yet to be delineated from the other three. In some
instances the SMP total includes money spent on programs outside
the control of the current Soldier System material development
organization. [Ref. 2:p. G-l] Weapon system and ammunition
acquisition, a part of the SMP, is not included, nor does the SMP
contain any 6.1 resources. Funding levels given in the SMP are
shown in the tables below, based on the FY 92/93 President's Budget
submitted to Congress in the 2nd Quarter, FY 91. [Ref. 2:pp. G-3 -
6]
Table 2-3: SOLDIER SYSTEM 6.2 AND 6 . 3A FUNDING (SMP)
$ Millions
FY91 FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95
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Total 484.8 433.1 1,513.8
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The Block I program is almost fully funded. [Ref . 15] The
Block II program, however, has funding shortfalls for three key
technologies. Lightweight power is $25m short of 6.2 funds;
Exoskeletal Structures is $7. 3m short of 6.2 and $6. 2m of 6 . 3A; and
Advanced Materials is $3. 9m short of 6.1 and $12. 5m of 6.2. [Ref.
16]
Expenditures covered explicitly in the SMP, furthermore,
are estimated to comprise only 34.5% of the total currently planned
Government investment in soldier system related technology, thus
offering a significant opportunity to "leverage" other resources
towards the stated objectives of the SMP. [Ref. 16] Other
contributors include the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) (19.6%), various Government, academic, and industry
consortia (18.5%), the Army Special Programs Office (18%), the
other services (7.6%), and other Government agencies (1.8%). [Ref.
16] Major Force Program 11 (USSOCOM) funds supporting soldier
system development were not included in this total, but the USSOCOM
technology base program alone will invest over $1 million in
soldier technology projects in FY 92. This subject is discussed in
Chapter V (USSOCOM) . Calculations of investment programs currently
pursued by allied governments were not available during the period
of thesis research.
F. SMP STATUS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The original 1991 draft of the SMP contained 13 specific
recommendations to the senior Army leadership. The most far
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reaching was endorsing the Soldier as a System concept . To
accomplish this, the SMP made four recommendations: create a
Program Manager for the Soldier System (PM-Soldier) ; designate all
funding through the PEO/PM-Soldier; designate the Soldier System as
a Major System in accordance with DoD 5000.1 and 5000.2; and create
a TRADOC Systems Manager for the Soldier System (TSM-Soldier) . It
also recommended that policies and regulations dealing with
clothing and individual equipment items be revised to support this
reorganization and Block modernization concept. [Ref . 2:pp. i/8.1-
3]
Prior to enacting these recommendations, the senior Army
leadership commissioned the Army Science Board (ASB) to conduct a
Summer Study to more fully assess the subject . Before discussing
the findings and recommendations of the ASB, it is necessary to




III. US ARMY ACQUISITION PROCESS
FOR SOLDIER ITEMS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses the Army acquisition process pertaining
to items included in the Soldier Modernization Plan. Soldier
System items are currently acquired through three different and
well established Army material development processes: Major and
Non-Major Systems, Medical Systems, and Clothing and Individual
Equipment. Each process performs the two traditional modernization
functions - "combat development" to establish material needs, and
"material development" to transform these needs into actual
equipment - through different channels and according to different
regulations
.
These channels and regulations are discussed in detail in this
chapter to:
• explain the difference between the SMP/Soldier System approach
and the material development process currently in place,
• outline the next steps required to establish the Soldier
System as a major system within DoD acquisition guidelines,
and
• identify the significance of these steps to USSOCOM.
The principal finding is that the SMP recommendation to
designate the Soldier System a DoD 5000.2 "Major System" is fully
justified, although such a designation will require several
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significant institutional changes within the Army. Ideally, these
changes would establish the Soldier System as an Army Designated
Acquisition Program (ADAP) under the authority of the Army
Acquisition Executive (AAE) with a clearly defined program manage-
ment structure. Without such a designation, implementation of the
SMP will be considerably more difficult, and the possibility of
effective direct USSOCOM-Soldier System material development will
be doubtful.
Part B of this chapter establishes the regulatory basis for the
acquisition of soldier items. Parts C (Acquisition Process) and D
(Acquisition Responsibilities) discuss the principal Army acquisi-
tion system in depth, outlining the process, significant responsi-
bilities, next steps for the Soldier System, and implications for
USSOCOM. Part E (Clothing and Individual Equipment) presents the
exceptions to the acquisition "rules" in Parts C and D that cover
clothing and individual equipment items
.
B. REGULATORY BASIS
1. Major, Non-Major, and Medical Systems: AR 70-1
Army Regulation (AR) 7 0-1, Systems Acquisition Policy and
Procedures , implements DoD 5000.1 and 5000.2 to govern the
acquisition of Army major and nonmajor acquisition programs. [Ref.
21 :p. 1] With the exception of Clothing and Individual Equipment
(CIE) , the objectives, policies, and principles of this regulation
apply to all Army material and medical acquisition programs. AMC-
TRADOC Pamphlet 70-2, a "how to" guide for Program Managers
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currently being upgraded to a Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet,
is the only authorized supplement. [Ref. 21 :p. 1]
Two additional regulations tie into AR 70-1. The Combat
Development process for Army managed programs is further detailed
in AR 71-9, Material Objectives and Requirements , including
specific instructions for preparing requirement documentation and
validation for all programs other than CIE . The use of Joint
Service Operational Requirements (JSOR) and Operational Needs
Statements (ONS) for initiating material development from outside
of the Army combat developer community is explained here. Policies
of the Army Logistic System , AR 700-9, contains additional guidance
on managing the Army Stock Fund for the issue, replenishment and
upgrade of Soldier System type items currently in the Army
inventory. Special provisions for unprogrammed urgent Special
Operations requirements are given in paragraph 2-3, "Requirements
determination and acquisition."
Soldier System programs that fall under the purview of AR
7 0-1 include all medical products, armaments, airdrop, foodstuffs,
field services, and some chemical items; that is, all of the Next
Generation systems except TEISS. The Soldier System, were it
managed as a major system, would be chartered under AR 70-1.
2. Clothing and Individual Equipment: AR 700-86
All aspects of the life-cycle management of clothing and
individual and equipment (CIE) are governed by AR 700-86. Precisely
defined in Appendix C, CIE can generally be thought of as all
uniforms, load bearing equipment, footwear, NBC clothing, and Army
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heraldic items. Thus, most items currently being fielded in the
SMP are CIE, as is the TEISS Next Generation system. CIE, however,
covers all 24 Army uniform systems - only seven of which are
included in the Soldier System, which is limited to items for use
in battle. [Ref . 23:pp. i-iii] AR 700-86 provides for exceptional
policies and practices regarding combat and material requirement
development, decision and review authority, resource management,
RDT&E, and life-cycle management of CIE. The AR 700-86 acquisition
process, therefor, is significantly different from that outlined in
AR 70-1 and AR 71-9. Section E discusses the CIE acquisition
process in detail, assessing its relevance to the Soldier System
and USSOCOM.
3 . Special Operations
Department of the Army (DA) -USSOCOM research, development
and acquisition relationships are established in Annex D of the
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between DA and USSOCOM. The MOA
explicitly describes USSOCOM-DA interface under AR 70-1, including
USSOCOM representation on Army Systems Acquisition Review Councils
(ASARCs) , MOAs with specific Army programs, funding, and propo-
nency. The scope of the MOA, however, is limited to "standard
items used by other DoD forces, but modified for SOF, and items
initially designed for, or used by, SOF but subsequently considered
for standardization" by the Army. [Ref. 24 :p. 2] No special
provisions are made in the MOA for SOF input into the long range




C. ACQUISITION PROCESS: AR 70-1
1 . Background
a. Combat and Material Developers
The need for a new system and the planned start point
for full scale development are determined in light of continuing
assessment of the threat , capabilities of existing systems, planned
improvements and upgrades, and user priorities. This ongoing
assessment integrates the work of the two traditional Army
counterpart functions, "combat development" and "material develop-
ment." The Combat Developer is a command or agency that "formu-
lates doctrine, concepts, organization, material requirements, and
objectives." [Ref. 21 :p. 91] In the acquisition process, the
combat developer is referred to as the "user" or the "user
representative." [Ref 22, p 6] Under AR 70-1, DA Staff proponency
for combat developments is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
(DCSOPS) and, for medical items, The Surgeon General (TSG) . [Ref.
21:pp. 7-9]
The "material developer" is the research, development
and acquisition command or agency assigned responsibility for RDT&E
and Procurement of the system. [Ref. 21 :p. 91] Department of the
Army AR 7 0-1 material development authority is the Army Acquisition
Executive (AAE) - currently the Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Research, Development, and Acquisition) (ASA(RDA)) - as delegated
from the Secretary of the Army and Defense Acquisition Executive
(DAE). [Ref. 25] Army implementation of the DoD 5000.2 milestone
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review process and decision authorities for Army AR 70-1 programs
are summarized in the tables in Appendix D.
b. Long Range Planning
Both the combat and material developer coordinate
extensively with the Army Staff and each other as essential to long
term success. The material developer maintains the Army technology
base to "anticipate correcting deficiencies and to increasing
capabilities." [Ref. 21 :p. 12] Technology base research and
development is guided by the Department of the Army (DA) Long Range
Research, Development, and Acquisition Plan (LLRDAP) , the Mission
Area Material Plan (MAMP) , and Extended Planning Annex (EPA) , each
of which covers the next 17 years. Combat developers conduct
mission area analysis (MAA) to assess the "capability of a force to
perform within a particular battlefield, " the results of which are
summarized in the Battlefield Development Plan (BDP) . [Ref. 21:p.
12] The BDP leads to specific functional area Modernization Plans.
"When the MAA process reveals a battlefield capability issue, the
combat and material developer jointly assess the best method to
establish a capability in response." [Ref. 21 :p. 12] Thus, the
LLRDAP /MAA and MAMP/BDP are mutually supportive. They are the
principal documents for the Army acquisition POM/PPBS process.
[Ref. 21:p. 13]
c. Technology Base
The LLRDAP and MAMP shape the Army's Technology Base
Master Plan, the goal of which is to channel resources into the
best areas to achieve "balanced overall capability to meet current
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and future threats." [Ref. 21 :p. 17] A large share of these
resources go into Advanced Technology Transition Demonstrators
(ATTDs) , a mix of "prototypes, components, surrogates, and
simulations." ATTDs serve three functions. [Ref. 21 :p. 17] They
demonstrate that the technology barriers that inhibit low-risk full
scale development have been overcome, develop data to support
realistic cost estimates, and provide practical proof of principle
for the technical approach to the operational concept. A success-
ful technology base program works to reduce technical risk and
avoid costly false program starts, and to "set the stage for
further streamlining the development process without increasing
overall risk." [Ref. 21 :p. 17]
d. Mission Needs Statement
The combat developer, with the support of the material
developer, has the lead responsibility for the concept and
requirement formulation process. [Ref. 22 :p. 3] This process
begins when the combat developer establishes that all non-material
solutions have been "impartially evaluated and eliminated" as
viable alternatives to a material problem, and the material
developer provides documented proof (usually through ATTDs) to
verify that "at least one option can be ready for near-term
engineering development." [Ref. 21 :p. 17] According to AR 70-1, an
Operational and Organizational (O&O) Plan, or, if required by DoD
5000.2, a Mission Need Statement (MNS) is then prepared.
As a separate program, the Soldier System has reached
this point in the documentation process. The eight Next Generation
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systems of the Soldier Modernization Plan Block I, however, have
passed this stage of development as elements of PEO and AMC managed
programs
.
Current Soldier System program management responsibili-
ties are discussed below in Sections D and E.
2 . Soldier System Status
The current Soldier Modernization Plan, when signed, might
quickly lead to an approved 0&0 Plan. The critical difference
between the two documents is in scope. An 0&0 Plan is a "pure"
material requirements document, while the SMP contains additional
training and doctrine guidance. The 0&0 Plan is normally consid-
ered to be the material program initiation document because of the
activities it sets in motion. [Ref. 22 :p. 7] The next steps under
AR 70-1 are outlined below as a guide to possible Soldier System
developments over the next 24 months.
The O&O Plan approval authority, and therefor the scope of
the Soldier System program charter, however, depends on the
resolution of at least two currently unanswered questions. First,
as outlined in Chapter II, is the actual funding levels dedicated
to the Soldier System. Funding levels largely determine the
acquisition category. Under Public Law, any program estimated to
require an eventual total expenditure of more than $300 million for
RDT&E or $1.8 billion for procurement in FY 90 constant dollars is
a Major Defense Acquisition Program; $115 million for RDT&E or $540
million for procurement constitutes a Major System. [Ref. 19:pp. i-
ii] Second, as described in Sections D and E below, is the outcome
of the reorganization of the traditional management responsi-
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bilities and processes for acquiring medical and non-medical items
under AR 70-1, and for acquiring clothing and equipment under AR
700-86.
3 . Soldier System - Next Steps i
An approved O&O Plan or Mission Need Statement begins the
formal Concept Formulation Process (CFP) that ends with the
statement of Required Operational Capabilities (ROC) , the document
that formally commits the Army to an acquisition program. 1 [Ref
22 :p. 8] The relationship of the CFP to the DoD Milestone time
table is shown in Figure 3-1, taken from AR 70-1.





























Figure 3-1: Concept Formulation Process (AR 70-1)
1 Army Regulations are currently being updated to conform to
DoD acquisition terminology policy. In the next edition of AR 70-
1, the ROC will become the Operational Requirements Document (ORD)
.
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The CFP consists of four sequentially prepared documents.
The material developer, supported by the combat developer, conducts
a Trade-Off Determination to fully assess all material options. The
combat developer then prepares a Trade-Off Analysis applying these
options to threat and doctrine. The Best Technical Approach (BTA)
,
in turn, is prepared by the material developer in response to these
two studies. The BTA defines the operational, performance and
supportability characteristics of the best and next best approach-
es, and refines the cost-schedule estimates. Based on the BTA, the
combat developer conducts a Cost and Operational Effectiveness
Analysis (COEA) , the results of which are provided to the program
decision authority to support milestone decision reviews. A
complete ROC is required for Milestone II approval. [Ref. 22 :p. 7]
AR 70-1 places extensive emphasis on tailoring this cycle
to each specific program in order to streamline the process. Much
of the technical analysis for the Soldier System has already been
accomplished through current program management organizations; some
is contained in the SMP . It is not clear, therefore, how long this
process would take if the Army decides to designate the Soldier
System as a major system.
Two additional observations from AR 70-1 and 71-9 are
relevant to the development of the Soldier System. First, the
approving authority for the initiation of an MDAP or ADAP program
is the Secretary of Defense. [Ref. 22 :p. 7] Thus, for the Soldier
System to be designated as a Major System, another layer of review
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authority - the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) - must be
briefed and approve
.
Second, after O&O approval but before the formal establish-
ment of a program office, program control is often exercised by a
Special Task Force (STF) or Special Study Group (SSG) , especially
when the program is considered to be high risk, other Services are
included, "a major resource impact is involved." or special
expertise is required. [Ref. 22 :p. 10] A Special Task Force is
chartered by the Chief of Staff and supervised by the DCSOPS. A
Special Study Group is chartered by the combat developer, often at
the direction of the DCSOPS. Appointment of an STF or SSG is the
next major step in the reorganization of Soldier System material
development. Appendix E lists the composition of a Special Task
Force
.
4 . Special Operations Considerations
The DA-USSOCOM MOA provides for USSOCOM membership on the
ASARC and the Source Selection Board (SSB) for all Army managed
MDAP and ADAPs with primarily SOF-peculiar applications, and for
USSOCOM decision authority for Army non-Major programs being
executed for USSOCOM. [Ref. 24 :p. 3] Program specific MOAs will
be negotiated in both of these situations. [Ref. 24 :p. 4]
The Soldier System, however, is currently neither of these.
Under the DA-USSOCOM MOA, the Soldier System interface options for
USSOCOM are limited to preparation of an Operational Needs
Statement submitted to HQDA and "monitoring" of the Soldier System
program management office, once one is designated. The preparation
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of an ONS is described in AR 71-9 paragraph 3-9. AR 70-1 paragraph
4-4 describes the approval process through the Chief of Staff, Army
Acquisition Executive, and DCSOPS.
Two other options, however, have emerged over the past 12
months . One is direct participation with TRADOC and the US Army
Health Services Command (USAHSC) in the combat development process.
The other is USSOCOM coordination with the Army's technology base
planners . This analysis is further developed in Chapter V
(USSOCOM) and Chapter VI (Conclusions)
.
Options for USSOCOM input into the Army CIE acquisition
process are discussed in Section E (CIE)
.
D. ACQUISITION RESPONSIBILITIES: AR 70-1
1 . General Overview
Acquisition responsibilities within the Army generally
belong to three different groups of organizations: the Secretariat
and Staff elements of the Headquarters, Department of the Army
(HQDA) ; the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE) - Program Executive
Officer (PEO) - Program Manager (PM) (AAE-PEO-PM) chain; and the
various major commands (MACOMs) and Agency level commands of the
Army. Each grouping has significant responsibilities for every
program. Specific responsibilities, however, vary depending on
program milestone and decision authority. [Ref. 21:pp. 6-11]
For the Soldier System, combat development is done
primarily by TRADOC, but the US Army Health Services Command
(USAHSC) has significant subsidiary responsibilities for developing
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medical requirements. The technology base is managed by AMC and
the US Army Medical Research and Development Command (USAMRDC)
.
After ROC approval, systems management responsibility will be
passed from the STF or SSG to a PEO or AMC program manager, under
AR 70-1. Combat development interface then often becomes the
responsibility of a Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Soldier
System Manager (TSM-Soldier)
.
2 . Department of the Army Level Responsibilities
Appendix F outlines the Soldier System related responsibil-
ities within HQDA under AR 70-1. Although extensive coordination
and input from each Staff and functional area is required, the
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development, and
Acquisition) [ASA(RDA)], the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
(DCSOPS)
, and the Surgeon General are the most significant for non-
CIE acquisition. The DCSOPS is the combat development and material
requirement proponent for all non-medical items. [Ref. 21 :p. 8]
The Surgeon General is the focal point for all medical acquisition.
[Ref. 21:p. 9]
The ASA(RDA) controls Army PEOs, programs the RDT&E and
Procurement budgets, coordinates with the DAE and other Services,
and is the decision authority for Army acquisition. [Ref. 21 :p. 7]
ASA(RDA) supervision of Soldier System RDT&E is currently
exercised through two standing committees . The Technology Base
Advisory Group (TBAG) is the Army's senior RDT&E advisory body.
Among its functions is establishing overall guidance for the
various system specific Technology Base Executive Steering
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Committees (TBESCs) . Each TBESC is a coordinating body of ASA(RDA)
appointed representatives from the technology base, user, and
material developer communities. Soldier System TBESC membership is
listed in Appendix G. [Ref. 15] USSOCOM representation on this
TBESC was established March 1991. [Ref. 26] USSOCOM membership on
the Technology Base Advisory Group (TBAG) is pending. [Ref. 2 9 :p.
40]
Below the HQDA level, all acquisition responsibilities are
divided into the two broad functional areas discussed above -
combat development and material development
.
3 . Combat Development
a . TRADOC
(1) General. The Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC) is the principal Army "combat developer" - the formulator
of doctrine, concepts, organization, material requirements and
priorities, and user representative during the acquisition process.
[Ref. 21 :p. 10] As noted, TRADOC interface with HQDA and Army
material developers is continuous and occurs through many channels,
beginning with long range planning, through the concept development
process, to the actual acceptance of material. This relationship
with the material developer is often described as TRADOC "user
pull" and AMC "technology push" for Army acquisition. [Ref. 27 :p.
17-9]
TRADOC has four important channels to manage
combat development, each relevant to the Soldier System: The
Combined Arms Center (CAC) and Combined Arms Support Command
45
(CASCOM) , TRADOC Systems Managers (TSMs) , and the TRADOC Analysis
Command (TRAC)
.
(2) CAC and CASCOM. The Combined Arms Center (CAC)
and Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM) coordinate and integrate
the input from the 17 "branch" combat development centers (Infan-
try, Armor, Field Artillery, etc.), each co-located with the branch
school headquarters and the focal point for feedback from Army
units. Material proponency ("sponsorship") within TRADOC is
usually established through CAC.
Prior to the "stand-up" of USSOCOM acquisition
capabilities, completed in FY 91 and discussed in Chapter V, combat
development for most Army Special Operations Forces (SOF) was the
responsibility of three different TRADOC branch centers. Green
Beret, PSYOP, and Civil Affairs needs were established by the John
F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (JFKSWCS) at Ft Bragg.
Ranger combat developments were the responsibility of the US Army
Infantry Center and School (USAICS) at Ft Benning. Special
Operations Aviation requirements were developed by the US Army
Aviation Center and School (USAAVCS)
.
JFKSWCS, now a part of the US Army Special Opera-
tions Command (USASOC) - simultaneously an Army MACOM and a
subordinate command of USSOCOM - is now responsible for all Army
SOF combat development. [Ref. 13 :p. i] Army SOF combat development
channels are discussed in Chapter V, but it is noted here that
considerable "institutional memory" still exists for direct
JFKSWCS-CAC-USAICS interface. USAICS, which still conducts the
46
Ranger and static-line Airborne courses as TRADOC schools,
continues to exercise considerable interest in Ranger related
material requirements through its responsibilities for all infantry
combat development. [Ref. 5]
(3) TRADOC System Managers (TSMs) . TRADOC System
Managers (TSMs) , usually an 06 level billet, are assigned to
interface with the PEO or AMC program managers of a specific group
of related critical material programs to maintain "user representa-
tion" throughout life-cycle development. The Army currently has 26
TSMs. [Ref. 31: pp. A102-6] In a few rare cases - some aspects of
TSM-Soldier implementation of the Soldier Enhancement Program, for
example - TSMs have taken a more active role in program decision
making. [Ref. 6]
TSM-Soldier was established in June 1990 to both
compile and update the Soldier Modernization Plan and to serve as
liaison with the Soldier System material developer. [Ref. 7] At
the time, it was thought that a single material manager would be
established in FY 91. [Ref. 5] Because of its dual functions, the
TSM-Soldier charter is somewhat broader than most TSMs . TSM-
Soldier is mandated to:
Serve as the conscience of the Army for the soldier and
the Army's centralized manager and interrogator for all
combat developments ... associated with the soldier as a
major battlefield system and the appropriate subsystems, to
include the individual soldier, and everything he wears,
consumes or carries for individual use in a tactical
environment, including those items in the soldier's
load. . .using the soldier modernization plan as the basis.
[Ref. 7]
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(4) TRADOC Analysis Command (TRAC) . The TRADOC
Analysis Command (TRAC) , finally, maintains several field offices
that analyze data from past operations and conduct simulations to
test and explore future concepts, including material performance
and solutions. Thus, TRAC both independently identifies potential
developments and analyzes solutions to problems surfaced through
CAC and CASCOM. TRAC conducts Technology Based War Games, such as
the series that prompted the Soldier Modernization Plan, and also
develops parts of the documentation supporting the concept
formulation process.
b. Medical: USAHSC
The US Army Health Services Command (USAHSC) , an Army
Major Command (MACOM) , is the Army medical combat developer,
trainer and user representative for activities assigned by TRADOC
and the Surgeon General. This includes developing doctrine,
concepts, material requirements priorities and Mission Need
Statements, personnel training, and conducting or supporting
assigned Operational Testing. [Ref. 21 :p. 11]
4 . Material Development
a. AAE-PEO-PM Responsibilities
The Army Acquisition Executive is the "Senior Procure-
ment Executive within the Army responsible for administering
acquisition programs in accordance with DoD policy and guidelines .
"
[Ref. 21 :p. 6] The AAE's general function is overall guidance and
review for Army managed programs. Specifically, the AAE assigns
DoD selected MDAP and ADAP programs to a specific PEO for adminis-
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tration, and ensures that "programmatic decision authority rests
only in the AAE/PEO/PM chain" for these programs. The AAE approves
and monitors each ADAP baseline. For non-major programs, the AAE
will ensure that there will be "no additional management layers
between the PM/program sponsor and the program decision authority."
[Ref. 21:pp. 6-7] As stated, under DoD 5000.2, the Secretary of
the Army is vested with AAE responsibility; AAE authority has been
delegated to the ASA(RDA)
.
Program Executive Officers (PEOs) are responsible to
the AAE for the "programmatics" (cost, schedule and performance
status) and for the planning, programming, budgeting and execution
of all assigned programs. [Ref. 21 :p. 7] As discussed below, this
PPBS responsibility is currently being transferred to PEOs from the
Army Material Command (AMC) , scheduled for completion in FY 93.
[Ref. 28] Program Manager responsibilities, further specified in
AR 70-17, can be summarized as "full line authority" for central-
ized management of a specific acquisition program. [Ref. 21 :p. 7]
Although few elements of the SMP are currently assigned
directly to a PEO, several PEO programs must be fully coordinated
with the Soldier Modernization Plan. These include developing the
next generation of armored vehicles (PEO-Armored Systems Moderniza-
tion, 11 programs) , Armaments (PEO-Armaments, one program)
,
Aviation (PEO-Aviation, 8 PEO programs, and one direct reporting to
the AAE) , trucks (PEO-Combat Support, 3 programs) , artillery (PEO-
Fire Support, 12 programs) , and radios and computers (PEO-Command
and Control Systems, 4 programs) . Without a single designated
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material developer, proponents of the Soldier System contend that
there is no focal point to systematically integrate the soldier's
combat uniform and individual equipment with these systems . This
same integration requirement holds for the AMC managed programs,
discussed below.
b. AMC Responsibilities
(1) General. The Army Material Command (AMC) has
three major material development responsibilities: (1) to manage
Army Technology Base programs (6.1, 6.2, 6.3A funding categories)
according to guidance from the ASA(RDA) and coordination with Army
combat developers; (2) to provide direct functional ("matrix")
support to PEO-PM managed programs/ and, (3) to manage non-PEO
procurement (6.3B, 6.4, etc.) programs. [Ref. 21 :p. 9] The
traditional fourth major AMC function - PPBS management of Army
acquisition - is being transferred to AAE-PEO-PM management. [Ref.
28] AMC will retain this responsibility, however, for RDT&E and
non-Major (non-PEO) programs. [Ref. 28]
(2) RDT&E. The US Army Laboratory Command (LABCOM)
,
a subordinate command of AMC, has cognizance over the preponderance
of the US Army non-Medical technology base. The Commanding General
of LABCOM is simultaneously the Director, AMC Technology Planning.
[Ref. 29 :p. 39] Major technology base initiatives are coordinated
through LABCOM with the AMC Staff and the office of the ASA(RDA)
.
However, most research and development is actually conceived,
programmed and managed by the various subordinate Research,
Development and Engineering Centers (RDEC's) and laboratories after
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direct coordination with the AMC functional area commands. [Ref.
10] Furthermore, Army technology base interfaces with the other
Services, universities, and the private sector usually occur either
through an ASA(RDA) chartered committee, such as a TBESC, or direct
contact with an specific RDEC or laboratory. [Ref. 30] Thus, the
program manager for a specific RDT&E program is usually assigned to
one of the subordinate labs rather than directly to LABCOM. PM-
SIPE at the Natick RDEC is one example. [Ref. 11]
For the Soldier System, ten AMC RDECs and
laboratories are currently conducting supporting RDT&E. They are
listed in Appendix H to illustrate the complexity of the management
task and scope of research relevant to the Soldier System. The
main goals of ASA(RDA) , AMC and LABCOM oversight are cross-
fertilization of ideas between labs and programs and maintaining a
strong link between actual research and user need. [Ref. 10] As
discussed below in Section E, the Natick RDEC has unique oversight
for this purpose relevant to the Soldier System.
(3) PEO and PM Support. The second major function of
AMC - providing matrix support to PEO programs - is accomplished
through the six functional area ("commodity") commands within AMC.
For Soldier System related programs, these are primarily the Troop
Support Command (TROSCOM) , the Communications and Electronics
Command (CECOM) , and the Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command
(AMCCOM) . [Ref. 5]
(4) AMC Program Management. AMC management of non-PEO
programs - the third major function of AMC - is done both through
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"direct reporting" program managers and through program managers at
the functional area commands. [Ref. 27 :p. 17-8] The program
charter for each AMC program specifies the reporting relationship.
[Ref. 21 :p. 5] Direct reporting program managers essentially
answer directly to the Commanding General of AMC. Matrix support
relationships vary, but most are directly supported by a single
functional area command. Program managers within the commodity
commands answer through the commanding general of that command.
The intent of DoD guidance to maintain no more than one level of
management between the decision authority and program manager is
maintained, however, as shown in the table in Appendix D. [Ref.
21:p. 32]
All AMC managed programs are currently categorized
as Nonmajor Level II or III; the program decision authority is
either the Commanding General, AMC, or the commander of the
commodity command. [Ref. 21 :p. 32] In general, AMC managed
programs are either new acquisitions of relatively small dollar
cost, or older major programs nearing the end of the product life-
cycle, thus falling out of PEO purview. [Ref. 25] AMC currently
manages 37 procurement programs (contrasted with 135 under the 11
PEOs and 8 directly reporting to the AAE) . [Ref. 31] The most
relevant to Soldier System integration are PM-Fixed Wing Aircraft,
PM-Light Armored Vehicles, PM-Light Observation Helicopters, PM-
Armored Combat Earthmover, PM-M113/M60 Family of Vehicles, PM-NBC
Defense Systems, PM-Training Devices, and, most significantly, PM-
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Clothing and Individual Equipment (PM-CIE) , discussed in Section E.
All are direct reporting AMC programs.
The AMC Troop Support Command (TROSCOM) , in
addition to providing matrix support to PM-CIE, manages the Soldier
System field service, ration, and airdrop projects. The Objective
Family of Small Arms program is under the Armaments, Munitions and
Chemical Command (AMCCOM) . The Communications and Electronics
Command (CECOM) manages the night vision, radios, and Global
Positioning projects for the TEISS program. [Ref . 30]
c. Medical Responsibilities: USAMRDC and USAMMA
The US Army Medical Research and Development Command
(USAMRDC) is the Army medical material developer. In addition to
medical RDT&E and Procurement management, USAMRDC must coordinate
with AMC and provide PEO matrix support to integrate medical RDT&E
into Army material programs. [Ref. 21 :p. 11] USAMRDC is specifi-
cally charged with primary responsibility to maintain a "respon-
sive" biomedical science and technology capability for injury and
illness prevention and treatment, developing skin decontamination
products, and correcting soldier vision. [Ref. 21 :p. 11] Army
medical RDT&E is conducted in the nine laboratories under USAMRDC.
[Ref. 2:p h-1] The most significant to the Soldier System is the
US Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine (USARIEM) , the
primary DoD facility for human physiology, environmental medicine,
and military nutritional research. [Ref. 12]
The US Army Medical Material Agency (USAMMA) has
logistics responsibilities for medical material acquisition similar
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to the US Army Logistics Evaluation Agency (see Appendix F)
, and is
further charged with managing medical NDI programs. [Ref . 21 :p 11]
E. ACQUISITION PROCESS AND ORGANIZATION: CIE
1 . CIE Acquisition
a . Background
Although seven of the eight Next Generation systems
covered in the Soldier Modernization Plan are managed under AR 7 0-
1, the cornerstone SIPE ATTD and TEISS programs are currently
managed under AR 700-86. Furthermore, more than half of the
specific items in the current SMP are classified as CIE, although
this percentage might decrease when the updated version of the SMP
is approved. As stated in the discussion of the regulatory basis
in Section B and Appendix C, CIE covers uniforms and load bearing
equipment, but not all CIE belongs to the Soldier System. As
mentioned, of the 24 uniform systems managed under AR 700-86, only
seven - the three versions of the battle dress uniform (BDU) , the
hot and cold weather uniforms, the flight uniform, and the combat
vehicle crewman uniform - are included in the SMP. AR 700-86
provides for a CIE acquisition process markedly different than the
AR 70-1 system. This greatly complicates implementation of the
SMP, designation of the Soldier System as a Major System, and the
pathways for USSOCOM-Army interface.
The current CIE management process resulted from the
mid 1980' s reorganization of the former US Army Material Readiness
Command (DARCOM) Commodity Management Office - CIE, itself a
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modification of even more traditional Army practices. [Ref. 20 :p.
3]
b. CIE Acquisition Framework
Proponency and procurement budget oversight of the
procurement and supply management of CIE have remained the
responsibility of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG)
proponent office, as opposed to the DCSOPS and ASA(RDA) under AR
70-1. RDT&E direction and funding, however, are exercised by the
ASA(RDA) as coordinated with the DCSOPS. TRADOC is the principal
combat developer, but AR 700-86 specifies a unique Statement of
Needs process for CIE items (SN-CIE) . The old Clothing Advisory
Group (CAG) , not the DCSOPS, remains the requirement validation
authority. Most significantly, the traditional Army Clothing
Equipment Board (ACEB) , chaired by the DCSLOG, is still the program
decision and review authority, with formal approval for all uniform
modifications retained by the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) .
[Ref. 23: pp. 3-5] ACEB and CAG membership is listed in Appendix I.
C . PM-CIE
Material development, including managing RDT&E, is the
responsibility of the Program Manager-CIE (PM-CIE) , following the
decisions of the ACEB. Although PM-CIE is designated as a direct
reporting AMC program manager receiving technical matrix support
from TROSCOM, PM-CIE' s charter resembles the scope of the old
commodity manager more closely than that of other AMC program
managers. PM-CIE is chartered under AR 700-86 to manage "all CIE
life-cycle development, technical testing and coordination of user
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testing, fielding and issue, maintenance, and disposal" - that is,
with RDT&E, procurement and supply functions. [Ref. 23 :p. 5] In
addition to answering to the ACEB, this is to be accomplished
through several unique acquisition relationships and responsibili-
ties .
PM-CIE is vested with policy control and supervision of
the Natick RDEC in order to manage CIE technology base activities
.
[Ref. 23 :p. 5] The RDT&E management process is similar to that in
AR 70-1, with funding primarily through AMC from the ASA(RDA)
managed RDT&E Program 6 (OCIE) account. [Ref. 23 :p. 3] However,
procurement funding, including funds for the PM-CIE executed
Soldier Enhancement Program (SEP) [Ref. 14], is programmed by the
DCSLOG in the OMA Programs 2, 7, and 8 and Military Personnel, Army
(MPA) budgets. [Ref. 23 :p. 4] In addition to SEP and TEISS funds,
as shown in Chapter II, the AMC technical assessment calculates
that PM-CIE currently spends about $9 million annually on Soldier
System related RDT&E, and between $68.4 and $72.9 million for
actual procurement. [Ref. 14]
In addition to material development, PM-CIE has the
traditional supply responsibility of monitoring the Army CIE
inventory, including policy supervision of the US Army Soldier
Support Activity, Philadelphia (USATSAP) . [Ref. 23 :p. 8] Thus, AR
700-86 explicitly directs PM-CIE to maintain liaison relationships
with the Army General and Special Staff, TRADOC, AMC, the Defense
Logistics Agency, the Defense Personnel Service Center, the General
Services Administration, and the Army Air Force Exchange System.
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According to AR 700-86, therefor, PM-CIE's total
funding profile is programmed both through AMC and the now non-
existent PEO-Troop Support. It is budgeted in several Army Staff
elements, including ASA(RDA), DCSLOG, DCSOPS, the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) , the Chief, Army Reserve (CAR) , and
the Director, Army National Guard (DANG). [Ref. 23:p. 4]
Medical RDT&E and CIE development, however, remains
outside this process as the responsibility of the Surgeon General.
PM-CIE must coordinate for the integration of medical items to be
worn as part of soldier CIE with USAMRDC, subject to the approval
of the DCSPER and DCSLOG. [Ref. 23 :p. 4]
2 . Significance to Soldier System
a. Decision Authority
In addition to the unique Procurement funding process,
the primary significance of the CIE process to the Soldier System
is that many Army elements with no acquisition responsibilities
under AR 70-1 currently exercise considerable influence over the
decision to transition Soldier System programs from Concept
Exploration to Engineering and Manufacturing Development and
beyond. These include the DANG, the CAR, the Deputy Inspector
General, the DCSPER, the "senior female officer on the Army General
or Special Staff, " and the Sergeant Major of the Army - six of the
eleven voting members of the ACEB. [Ref. 23 :p. 11] The CAG has
similar representation, as well as senior female and enlisted
representatives from the Army's major troop commands. [Ref. 23 :p.
12]
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Inclusion of these elements in the program approval
process is intended to enhance direct and broad-based user input
and control over Army uniforms. [Ref. 23 :p. 1] The CAG and ACEB
are probably well suited to decide whether or not to adopt black
shoulder boards to replace the current green ones on the Class B
uniform. These two boards are manifestly not appropriate, however,
to assess the Soldier System on technical and programmatic grounds
.
As the Army begins to implement the SMP, it is doubtful that the
senior Army and OSD leadership will allow them to exercise control
over such a significant acquisition funding profile, regardless of
the past merits of this approach. It is also doubtful that the
Soldier System program manager, when one is designated, will be
subject to both ASARC and ACEB review for components of the same
system.
b. Requirement Documentation: SN-CIE
The AR 700-86 process does provide for a considerably
less formal process for developing statements of need. The
Statement of Need-CIE (SN-CIE) essentially performs the function of
the AR 70-1 ROC with much less documentation. [Ref. 23 :p. 13] The
SN-CIE takes two forms, one for new CIE concepts such as TEISS, and
another for modification of current CIE, such as some SEP issues.
Every SN-CIE consists of three parts. Part I outlines
the concept or modification, and is reviewed by the TRADOC CIE
Concept Working Group (CWG) . Part II is the technical assessment
and basis of issue plan, developed by AMC after CWG approval of
Part I. Part III is the TRADOC-AMC jointly proposed Test and
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Evaluation Master Plan. For modifications of existing CIE, this
process can be very short. Following completion of testing, the
SN-CIE is type classified and submitted to the CAG . CAG recommen-
dations are passed to the ACEB for program approval. [Ref. 23:pp.
12-14]
c . Soldier System - Next Steps
As indicated, the Soldier System cannot be designated
a Major System under AR 700-86. The TEISS program, however, is
moving forward managed by PM-CIE . The next step for the Soldier
System is to clearly delineate which CIE items belong to the
Soldier System, and establish a mechanism to coordinate TEISS
approval with the decision authority for the other seven Block I
Next Generation systems. This has not yet been done.
3 . Significance to Special Operations
AR 700-86 paragraph 7-7, "CIE requirments for special
operations forces," restates the unprogrammed urgent requirement
provisions of AR 700-9 paragraph 2-3, but no special provisions are
made otherwise for submitting long range SOF material requirements
to the ACEB. Nor does the DA-USSOCOM MOA cover the AR 700-86
process. USSOCOM options regarding Army CIE are discussed further
in Chapter V (USSOCOM) and Chapter VI (Conclusions) , but are
essentially no different than those under AR 70-1.
G. CONCLUSION
The Soldier System clearly does not fit into the Army's
established process for acquiring items worn, carried and consumed
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in combat. This was manifestly clear by the beginning of FY 91,
prompting the Chief of Staff to charter the Army Science Board
(ASB) to analyze the situation and make specific recommendations.
The findings and recommendations of the Army Science Board study
are summarized in Chapter IV. Chapter V (USSOCOM) is included as
a reference for those unfamiliar with USSOCOM acquisition authori-
ties and objectives.
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IV. ARMY SCIENCE BOARD
SUMMER STUDY
A. INTRODUCTION
This Chapter presents the findings and recommendations of the
Army Science Board's Summer Study on the "Soldier as a System," and
discusses their relevance to both the next steps for the Soldier
System and USSOCOM. The major recommendation is for the Army to
thoroughly reorganize the acquisition processes outlined in the
previous chapter by establishing a single Soldier System material
developer chartered in accordance with AR 70-1. This recommenda-
tion is still being reviewed by the ASA(RDA) . Most of the
supporting recommendations, however, are already being implemented
by the Army elements involved, and should be completed over the
next 12 to 18 months. [Ref. 30]
The key recommendations are summarized in Part C. The six
major issue areas analyzed by the ASB are discussed in Part D.
B. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
In January 1991, the ASA(RDA) directed that the Army Science
Board conduct a "Summer Study" on the Soldier System, to be
completed by the following September. TRADOC and AMC were
designated as co-sponsors, and study participants were appointed by
the ASA(RDA) with instructions to [Ref. 15]
:
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• Assess the existing RDT&E and Procurement process in relation
to the soldier,
• Recommend the best management organization and approach, and
• Determine if the Soldier System should be managed as a major
system.
The Chief of Staff further asked the ASB Summer Study to
identify performance "leap-aheads" and enabling technologies, and
to specifically address the issue of psychological and physiologi-
cal interfaces. Following the completion of Desert Shield/Desert
Storm, where many problems of CIE and individual soldier equipment
integration were identified, the Chief of Staff enlarged the
study's scope to assess ways for the Soldier System to improve the
"quality of life for the soldiers in the field." [Ref. 14]
For the study, the Soldier System was defined to encompass
"items and equipment worn, consumed or carried by the soldier in
the field for personal use" plus "all that supports the living and
working conditions of soldiers in the field." [Ref. 15]
C. KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
The ASB study fully endorsed the Soldier System concept . In
its final briefing to the Army's senior leadership, the ASB made
several specific recommendations for implementation in FY 92.
Summarized in Figure 4-1, the supporting findings and recommenda-
tions are outlined in the six issue areas discussed below. Figure
4-2 shows the proposed Soldier System program organization
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Figure 4-2: Proposed Soldier System Organization [Ref. 14]
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D. SIX ISSUE AREAS: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2
1 . Requirement: Documentation
a) Findings :
(1) The Concept Based Requirement System (CBRS)
process has not been completed for the Soldier System, especially
concerning threat analysis . Likely Soldier System missions and
tasks in the Soldier Modernization Plan (SMP) are not firmly linked
to the scenario based threat analysis applicable to the individual
soldier, nor has the intelligence community developed this analysis
in the depth necessary to support the Soldier System as a major
system.
(2) The analytic tools for performance analysis
typical for major systems are not available for the Soldier System.
The primary deficiency is in the area of simulation technology.
(3) Special Operations Forces (SOF) , especially the
Army's Green Berets and Rangers, provide strongest user pull for
future Soldier System capabilities.
b) Recommendations :
(1) The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
(DCSINT) , in coordination with the Defence Intelligence Agency and
TRADOC, must develop scenario based threat and analysis for future
Soldier System.
(2) TRADOC should complete CBRS analysis for the
Soldier System by 1992.
2 All findings and recommendations presented are paraphrased
from Reference 14.
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(3) TRADOC should develop and employ scenario based
war games and simulations with greater emphasis on the future
threat to the Soldier System.
(4) The TRADOC Systems Manager-Soldier (TSM-S) should
"formally" coordinate with USSOCOM and other Services for require-
ments and resources.
c) Analysis
(1) Relevance to Soldier System. These findings
support the key ASB recommendations to the DCSINT and Commanding
General of TRADOC. The gap between current requirement documenta-
tion and technology base programs must be overcome in order for the
Block I program to receive permission for full scale Engineering
and Manufacturing Development, as outlined in Chapter III.
The threat to the individual soldier has not been
analyzed in "depth, " as mentioned in the first finding, in part
because of the concurrent debate within the intelligence community
over the most likely combat environment of the future, and in part
because the traditional focus of intelligence supporting the
acquisition process has been on weapon systems capabilities.
Integrating this analysis to the level of threats to individual
soldiers has not been done in the past.
The fourth recommendation (supported by finding
3) is intended to establish the groundwork for permanent, institu-
tionalized links between USSOCOM, TRADOC and the material developer
of the Soldier System.
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(2) Relevance to USSOCOM. Recommendation number four
offers USSOCOM a "window of opportunity" to fulfill the intent of
its unique acquisition authority, outlined in Chapter V (USSOCOM)
.
To accomplish this, however, USSOCOM must insure that its own
requirements development and technology base process can properly
identify and validate SOF needs.
2 . Acquisition Strategy
a) Findings:
(1) Because of the incomplete requirement documen-
tation, specific capability needs are not effectively influencing
the material developers' current technology base investment
strategy. Priorities given in the SMP are not sufficient for long
range use
.
(2) The current SMP establishes the Soldier System
concept, and does provide an effective road map to the material
developers for the Block I Soldier program.
(3) The Block II Soldier program in the current SMP is
unrealistic and currently unfunded.
(4) Although the current SMP has not yet been formally
approved, it is being used as a baseline document for both combat
and material development . The SMP is critical to the current
planning process.
(5) The total current Soldier System RDT&E and
Procurement funding level is very difficult to assess - it may be





(1) TRADOC must develop a prioritized capability needs
list for inclusion in the SMP
.
(2) AMC should reevaluate the technology base funding
plan based on an approved SMP . Soldier System funding should be
centrally managed.




(1) Relevance to Soldier System. The SMP will most
probably be signed by the Chief of Staff in March 19 92, but the
other two recommendations will likely take more time to implement.
As indicated in the first finding, prioritization depends on valid
requirements and intelligence analysis, and therefore seems to be
a FY 92/93 task. Centralized funding, as outlined in the previous
chapters, is a very complex task that cannot be realistically
accomplished until the senior Army leadership establishes a central
Soldier System material developer.
(2) Relevance to USSOCOM. Army implementation of
these three recommendations, in conjunction with proper USSOCOM
requirement documentation, offers USSOCOM an even greater opportu-
nity to leverage the Army Soldier System to meet SOF needs
.
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3 . Acquisition Management
a) Findings :
(1) All soldier material items are interdependent.
(2) Currently no mechanism exists for critical trade-
off analysis.
(3) There is currently no central organizational focus
for material development. There are "multiple programs, multiple
organizations, multiple systems, multiple technologies, and
multiple kinds of soldiers, " and thus limited power to affect
outcomes across the whole system, despite the amount of money being
spent
.
(4) The TBESC charter is too narrow in focus to allow
it to exercise central control over Soldier System RDT&E, and does
not allow it any input into Procurement.
(5) The TSM-Soldier scope greatly exceeds all other
TSMs, thus providing a forum for centralized material requirement
development. The TSM-S, however, has insufficient resources and
authority to assure material development success.
b) Recommendations :
(1) A General Officer or SES should be appointed to
manage the material development and acquisition of the Block I and
all follow on Soldier Systems. Current Soldier System related
programs should be brought into one organization, and restructured
within existing programmed resources.
68
(2) A focal point should be established to manage




(1) Relevance to Soldier System. These findings are
the most significant of the ASB study, and support the most far
reaching recommendations . The future of the Soldier System as a
Major System, and of effectively using the DoD systems engineering
methodology to integrate items used by the individual soldier,
fully depend on a single material developer being designated. This
developer, furthermore, must have the authority to overcome the
many institutional obstacles to effective integration outlined in
Chapter III. The original ASB recommendation was for the AAE/-
ASA(RDA) to designate an Army PEO for the Soldier System. Feedback
from the ASA(RDA) convinced the ASB to formally recommend the
structure outlined in Figure 5-2 as the ninth direct reporting AAE
program office. The verbal recommendation to the ASA(RDA) was
specifically that Soldier System management be taken out of AMC and
placed under the AAE.
The ASB, however, made no specific recommendation
on resolving the program duties and responsibilities differences
between AR 70-1 and AR 700-86.
The second recommendation both supports the
recommendation for a single material developer, and addresses the
current TBESC weakness. The TBESC, as stated in Chapter III, has
no control over Soldier System technology base funds, and thus
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lacks the authority to implement its decisions. The intent of this
recommendation to the ASA(RDA) is to end the "parochialism" found
in the Technology Base Assessment, discussed below.
(2) Relevance to USSOCOM. For the individual Green
Beret, SEAL and Ranger, Army implementation of these recommenda-
tions might be the single most significant material management
development since the creation of USSOCOM. As provided for in the
DA-USSOCOM Memorandum of Agreement, USSOCOM should immediately
establish a direct relationship with this new program office, and
negotiate USSOCOM representation on the program ASARC
.
4 . Technology Assessment
a) Findings :
(1) Near term, "leap ahead" advances are possible in
Soldier System application of the Global Positioning System,
advances in C3, aural sensors and chemical-biological protection.
(2) The current material development organization is
insufficient to effectively leverage funds across the technology
base community (DARPA, NASA, DoE, etc.).
(3) The current material development structure has a
very limited peer review process - specific technology advocates
dominate the alternative search process in many Soldier System
technology areas
.
(4) In the long term, some current Soldier System
technology base research will offer great possibilities for





(1) Proceed with near term and Block I modernization
to capture currently available technologies, as outlined in the
SMP .
(2) Set aside a $10m RDT&E funding "wedge" to invite
and incorporate technologies from non-Army sources
.
(3) Establish a formal interdisciplinary and indepen-
dent alternative search process to review the RDT&E investment
strategy.
c) Analysis
(1) Relevance to Soldier System. Again, the ASB
assessment of Soldier System technology fully supports the Major
Systems approach to acquiring soldier items . These findings and
recommendations, however, are additionally intended as a warning of
the risks incurred by not ending the current "parochial" approach
to material development. Without more centralized program control,
much of the projected RDT&E investment will be squandered.
(2) Relevance to USSOCOM. The near-term advances
identified by the ASB have immediate SOF applications. The
comments on limited peer review within the current RDT&E process
are similar to many traditional SOF criticisms of Natick RDEC.
USSOCOM should immediately take advantage of the Army's RDT&E
resource invitation to leverage Army Soldier System dollars to
acquire some of these near-term advances for selected SOF small
units, and to further influence the Army's development process to
meet SOF requirements. If possible, the USSOCOM science advisor
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should become an accredited representative to the Army's alterna-
tive search process.
5 . System Architecture
a) Findings:
(1) An integrated modular architecture for the Soldier
System appears to be the best technical approach, and is currently
the most effective way to coordinate and focus RDT&E investments.
(2) Many examples of current equipment interface
mismatches exist , thus highlighting the problems with the tradi-
tional approach to acquiring soldier items.
3) Throughout the material development process
currently in place, there exists an overall lack of system
engineering methodology.
b) Recommendations :
(1) Focus Block I development on producing integrated
modular equipment and consumable items
.
(2) Apply the systems methodology to all aspects of
Soldier System material development
.
c) Analysis
The relevance of these findings and recommendations are
discussed together with those concerning the SIPE ATTD program.
6. SIPE ATTD Program
a) Findings :
(1) Tests scheduled for 1992 are an important step
towards soldier modernization and modular technology development,
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but are not extensive enough to determine the value of any
particular sub-system.
(2) No clear SIPE program exit criteria exist.
(3) Overall, the SIPE program has been well managed.
(4) Several individual modular components appear
realistic - low technological risk and affordable - for engineering
and manufacturing development in the mid-term.
b) Recommendations :
(1) Establish SIPE program exit criteria.
(2) Redesign the test program to delineate high/low
payoff technologies at modular sub-system level
.
(3) Conduct a more rigorous risk analysis to identify
obstacles to success.
c) Analysis
(1) Relevance to Soldier System. The proposed Soldier
System architecture and supporting SIPE program recommendations
both endorse the current modular approach to systems integration
and reinforce the criticism of the current RDT&E process found in
the technology assessment . Future RDT&E must be firmly linked to
valid user requirements and programmatic risks must be identified
prior to approval for transition out of the technology base. In
reality, these ASB findings and recommendations mean that the
Soldier System Block I will not be ready for Milestone II/III
approval until at least FY 94, and that procurement and fielding
will occur in modules over several years. The integrated helmet
and weapon, for example, might be in the inventory many years
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before the complementary climate controlled body armor is ready for
issue
.
(2) Relevance to USSOCOM. The specific ASB criticisms
of the SIPE program are essentially the same as those expressed by
USSOCOM. This dissatisfaction with SIPE led to the two year
USSOCOM sponsored Battle Dress System (BDS) technology base program
at the Human Engineering Laboratory (HEL) in FY 91, discussed in
Chapter 5 (USSOCOM) . Implementation of these recommendations, in
conjunction with the others to end Army Soldier System parochialism
and establish coordinated control over all material development,
might enable USSOCOM to meet SOF requirements through Army channels
and by leveraging Army resources
.
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V. US SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
ACQUISITION PROCESS
A. INTRODUCTION
The US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is the
centerpiece of a larger effort initiated by Congress in the
mid 1980' s to revitalize the ability of the United States to
conduct special military operations . Among the command' s many
functions is rectifying a gap that has always existed in the
method traditionally used to equip special operations forces
.
USSOCOM has both combat and material development proponency
for "Special Operations (SO) -peculiar" items used by its
assigned forces, and budget responsibility for RDT&E and
Procurement of such items. The period 1987-92 was designated
as the "crosswalk" phase to transfer these functions and
budgets from the Services to USSOCOM. Beginning in FY 92
,
USSOCOM has full POM responsibility for the acquisition of SOF
peculiar items
.
By almost any measure, these changes have been for the
better. In the long term, centralizing acqusition authority
is probably the best way to achieve the intent of Congress
Even in the short run, it has facilitated a higher material
readiness level of US special operations units.
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Several issues, however, have yet to be sorted out. The
ultimate success of USSOCOM acquisition depends on their
eventual resolution. USSOCOM interface with the Army's
Soldier System is a good example. Foremost among these issues
are the long-term execution of the USSOCOM combat development
and validation process, integrating these requirements with
the plans of the Services, and effectively monitoring of
material programs executed in part for USSOCOM by the
Services
.
Analysis and specific answers to the research questions
are presented in Chapter VI . This chapter presents supporting
background information. Part B (SOF Organization) briefly
discusses the organization of special operations within the US
force structure. Appendix J presents greater background
detail for the general reader on special operations, including
specific missions, forces, operational characteristics, and
the researcher's analysis of emerging SOF roles in national
defense. Appendix K lists the desired general "opertational
characteristics" of SOF equipment. Parts C (Authority) and D
(Concept) outline the general USSOCOM approach to acquisition.
Parts E (Combat Developments) , F (Transition to Material
Development) , and G (Material Development) elaborate on the
USSOCOM acquisition process. Part H (Current DA-USSOCOM
Contacts) reviews the major events over the last 24 months






In 1987 Congress legislated a new organizational and
management structure for special operations : an Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low Intensity
Conflict) [ASD (SO/LIC) ] , a United States Special Operations
Command (USSOCOM) , and a separate major force program for
special operations (MFP-11) . [Ref. 32:p. 3] As stated,
Appendix 5-1 provides a more detailed definition of "special
operations" and the forces and mission involved. The primary
functions of the ASD (SO/LIC) are to coordinate DoD policy on
special operations and execute MFP-11 budget proponency . [Ref.
30]
2 . USSOCOM
USSOCOM is the headquarters for all DoD special opera-
tions . Located at MacDill AFB in Tampa, FL, and commanded by
a four star general officer (the Commander-in-Chief, Special
Operations Command) , its assigned missions and forces reflect
the requirement to provide viable military options that fall
between formally declared war and passive response to policy
makers dealing with difficult international situations.
USSOCOM assigned forces include all Active and Reserve
Special Operations Forces (SOF) , Psychological Operations
(PSYOP) units, and Civil Affairs (CA) units based in the
United States. SOF include: Army Special Forces (Green
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Berets) , Army Rangers, Army Special Operations Aviation units,
Navy SEALs, Navy Special Boat Units, and Air Force Special
Operations units.
Each Service has a major subordinate command assigned
and answerable to USSOCOM. All CA and PYSOP forces and Army
SOF units are assigned to the United States Army Special
Operations Command (USASOC) , an 09 command headquartered at Ft
Bragg, NC. Navy special operations units belong to the
Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM) , and Air Force units
to the 1st Special Operations Wing (1st SOW) of the 23rd Air
Force (also titled AFSOC)
.
The USSOCOM headquarters staff has several Director-
ates designed to assist in conducting operations and managing
resources. Many are involved in the acquisition process,
including the Directorates of Resources (J8) , Joint Studies
(J5) , Modernization Planning (J5-7) , Operations (J3) , and the
Special Operations Research, Development and Acquisition
Center (SORDAC) . In addition, the staff of each Service
subordinate command performs similar functions and interacts
with the USSOCOM staff.
3. MFP-11
Major Force Program - 11 covers all the direct
expenses of these units, including acquiring SO-peculiar
equipment and services. [Ref. 33 :p. 3-2] Indirect expenses
are paid by the Services. The total MFP-11 obligational
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authority for FY 90 was $3,381 billion; FY 91 was $2. 511b; FY
92 and 93 are $3. 007b and $2. 724b, respectively. [Ref. 34] Of
this, $168m was RDT&E in FY 90, and $191m in FY 91. RDT&E
spending in future years is programmed at $276m (FY 92) , and
$2 67m (FY 93) . [Ref. 35 :p. Ill] Of these funds, however, only
about $10m is now actually programmed and managed by the
USSOCOM technology base program manager. [Ref. 30] A much
larger amount is spent each year on actual procurement,
although the precise dollar figure is classified. [Ref. 30]




Title 10 United States Code, Section 167 provides the
USSOCOM commander in chief with the responsibility to validate
and prioritize SO-peculiar requirements, and to develop and
acquire SO-peculiar equipment, supplies, and services. Public
Law 100-180 amends Section 167 to add Head of Agency (HOA)
status for the commander-in-chief, subject to the authority,
direction and control of the Secretary of Defense. The
implementing memorandum granting this under Chapter 137, Title
10 US Code, was signed by the Secretary of Defense on 4 May
1988. Subpart 202.1 of the Defense Federal Acquisition
Regulation Supplement (DFARS) was adjusted to recognize this
authority. [Ref. 36: pp. 2-3]
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Significantly, HOA status includes the authority to
establish a contracting activity and to join in agreements
with other Agency Heads to delegate procurement functions and
program management responsibilities. This gives USSOCOM the
requisite authority to develop and acquire SO-peculiar




The intent of these changes is to insure that Special
Operations Forces are adequately equipped to perform the full
range of required missions, and to take the lead in research,
development, acquisition and testing of equipment peculiar to
special operations forces. [Ref. 37]
In essence, this intent requires USSOCOM to focus and
integrate special operations programs which have, in the past,
generally been unilateral Service efforts. This will lend
priority to relatively inexpensive SO programs where total
cost has not, by Service criteria in the past, been indicative
of criticality and need for senior level supervision and
management. [Ref. 32 :p. 3-2] This also requires USSOCOM to
prepare accurate program baselines defendable in the PPBS/POM
process. [Ref. 37]
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To meet this intent , the USSOCOM must accomplish three
broad objectives within the DoD acquisition system. First is
to field good sustainable equipment in the shortest possible
time. The strategy and process for this is discussed below.
In general, this is to be achieved by "maximizing" the use of
the authority given. USSOCOM can tailor and streamline the
process in-house to reduce the time required by developing a
solid linkage between user, acquirer, and resourcer. The
headquarters of all three are co-located in the same building.
This ought to result in well articulated requirements,
accurate cost estimates, and executable acquisition strategies
in line with warfighting priorities. [Ref. 36 :p. 4]
Second is to adhere to public law and Federal
procurement policies. [Ref. 36 :p. 5] Third is to develop
clear channels of authority consistent with the DoD policy and
regulations. [Ref. 36 :p. 5] This is discussed below under
management strategy. In general, however, USSOCOM must
actively manage a small number of in-house programs and
closely monitor other systems acquisitions executed by outside
organizations to ensure USSOCOM needs are met.
2 . Management Strategy
As stated, USSOCOM must validate, prioritize, program
and fund all SO-peculiar requirements. SO-peculiar require-
ments are:
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Any item designated for, or primarily used by, Spe-
cial Operations Forces in support of special opera-
tions missions. These include standard items used by
other DoD forces, but modified for SOF, and items
initially designed for, or used by SOF, but subse-
quently considered for standardization by other DoD
forces. Criticality of need may also dictate the item
to be SO-peculiar. [Ref. 24 :p. 2]
Developing and executing a long term strategy
consistent with the intent of Congress, however, has proven
difficult. Over the last 36 months, USSOCOM acquisition
authority has been used to satisfy near-term SO peculiar
material requirements identified and programmed (usually with
low priority) years earlier within the Services. Because of
the "growing pains" of USSOCOM, less command emphasis has been
placed on integrating the combat development process of Army,
Navy and Air Force SOF units, and linking these combat
developments to actual technology base research programs
.
[Ref. 30] As a result, the delineation of combat and material
development responsibilities is not as clearly defined within
USSOCOM as in the Army. Similarly, the issue of integrating
"non-peculiar" SOF combat developments into the established
Service processes has not been fully addressed. This latter
problem is especially relevant to the Army Soldier System and




The official USSOCOM command acquisition strategy,
however, does define clear general guidance for material
development
.
First, for cost reasons, USSOCOM will use the existing
Service and Agency acquisition systems whenever possible.
[Ref. 36 :p. 5] Executive Agreements between USSOCOM and the
other Agency Heads, such as the DA-USSOCOM Memorandum of
Agreement, have been negotiated to specify procurement and
program management functions. [Ref. 29 :p 7] Thus, USSOCOM
delegates the majority of its acquisition duties. The
decision criteria for delegation vice in-house material
development are discussed below in Section F (Transition to
Material development)
.
Second, because it is anticipated that most S0-
peculiar requirements will be acquired by Service and Agency
organizations through these agreements, USSOCOM has tailored
its process to facilitate and monitor the SO related acquisi-
tion effort of these other organizations. [Ref. 37] Program
Managers will be appointed only when no other organization can
meet the stated USSOCOM objectives. [Ref. 36 :p 6] USSOCOM
program monitoring and management organization is discussed




1 . Pre-USSOCOM Process
As discussed in Chapter III, prior to the legal
establishment of USSOCOM acquisition responsibilities, combat
development for Army SOF was performed by three TRADOC branch
centers. Green Berets, Civil Affairs, and PSYOPS requirements
were the responsibility of JFKSWCS; Rangers were covered by
the Army Infantry Center and School (USAICS) , and Aviation by
the Army Aviation Center and School (USAACS) . The work of
each was integrated by CAC and CASCOM, approved by TRADOC and
validated by the DCSOPS. (CIE requirements, as discussed in
Chapter III, were validated by the DCSLOG and ACEB
.
) In the
late 198 0s, Army Regulations were updated to streamline this
process for urgent SOF requirements. Combat developments for
Navy and Air Force special operations units were also per-
formed according to traditional service practices. [Ref . 30]
Proponency for almost all items included in the Soldier
System, however, was assigned to the Army. [Ref. 26]
Thus, establishing USSOCOM acquisition authority was
followed not only by the creation of new acquisition offices
at USSOCOM headquarters, but also by a concurrent reorganiza-
tion of responsibilities within SOF subordinate units and the
Services, especially the Army's TRADOC. The SOF related
combat development responsibilities of USAICS and USAAVCS
passed to JFKSWCS, although no personnel were reassigned to
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maintain expertise. [Ref . 30] JFKSWCS was removed from TRADOC
and assigned to the newly formed USASOC. Within USASOC, a
process for approving JFKSWCS developments had to be estab-
lished. The newly created USSOCOM subordinate special
operations commands in the Air Force and Navy also had to
redefine their special operations combat development process-
es . The new procedures in all three Services had to be
integrated with requirements identified through other channels
at USSOCOM for requirement validation and program funding.
In addition to the concurrent problems associated with
the "crosswalk" of funds from the Services to MFP-11 and the
sharp learning curve from simultaneously reorganizing all
three layers of the SOF chain of command, two additional
organizational problems remain. Both directly impact on
USSOCOM interface with the Soldier System. First, no formal
mechanism has been established between Army SOF and TRADOC to
replace the coordinating and integration functions previously
performed by CAC and CASCOM. Second, potential capabilities
up to 17 years in the future are difficult to identify as SO-
peculiar. A large requirements overlap exists between SOF
Aviation and USAAVCS, and between Green Berets and Rangers and
USAICS . More detail on these overlaps for the Soldier System






As indicated, SOF acquisition requirements are
identified by the USSOCOM subordinate commands, the regional
CINCs, the Joint Mission Analysis (JMA) prpcess, or the
USSOCOM staff Directorates. These requirements are normally
developed from changes in targets and identified threats,
technological opportunities, or from cooperative foreign
ventures. For assigned Army SOF units, the emerging combat
development channel between JFKSWCS, USASOC and USSOCOM is
summarized in Figure 5-1. [Ref. 38]
MATERIAL REQUIREMENTS
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
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Figure 5-1: Army SOF Combat Development
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USASOC approves Statements of Need (SON) submitted by
subordinate Army special operations units; JFKSWCS then
prepares the Mission Need Statement (MNS) . Mission Need
Statements are approved by USASOC and validated by the USSOCOM
Operations Directorate Requirement Office (J3-R) . For MFP-11
RDT&E and Procurement funded requirements , several USSOCOM
staff directorates further review and integrate validated
USASOC needs with other SOF requirements . For Soldier System
items, this includes the Combat Development and Modernization
Directorate (J5-7) and Directorate of Resources (J8) . [Ref
.
30] Final POM approval follows the recommendation of the
appropriate USSOCOM acquisition review panel . [Ref. 39:p. 3-2]
The USSOCOM J5-7 is currently developing the master
functional area Modernization Plans to coordinate and priori-
tize validated inputs from the various special operations
communities, and to "matrix" these capability needs with the
long range plans of the other Services and Federal agencies.
[Ref. 37] When completed, these plans will be validated by
J3-R and integrated into the MFP-11 POM and the SOF Technology
Base Master Plan being developed by SORDAC. [Ref. 30] Because
of the "growing pains" of USSOCOM, this process is far from
complete, although it is critical to long term coordination
with TRADOC. [Ref. 30]
Adoption of a specific acquisition strategy is
discussed below in Section F (Transition to Material Develop-
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ment) , but it is noted here that under this process, enclosure
in the MFP-11 POM starts the formal involvement of USSOCOM
technology base and program management assets. [Ref . 39 :p 3-1]
The potential weakness with this late technology base involve-
ment is discussed in Chapter VI (Conclusions)
.
Analysis of this process further highlights the two
problems mentioned in the review of the pre-USSOCOM process
and subsequent changes above. For Army units subordinate to
USSOCOM, the only channel now available for introducing
Statements of Need into the acquisition process is through
USASOC. The majority of such input is not necessarily SOF-
peculiar, and must eventually be passed to TRADOC. In
reality, especially for individual soldier items, this means
coordinating Army SOF needs with USAICS and TSM-Soldier.
Recommendations for improving the current USSOCOM requirements
process for this is discussed in the next chapter.
F. TRANSITION TO MATERIAL DEVELOPMENT
After requirements are identified and resourced through
the MFP-11 POM/PPBS process, the USSOCOM Commander-in-Chief
(in his capacity as the Special Operations Acquisition
Executive) coordinates with the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition) (the Defense Acquisition Executive) and inter-
ested Service and Agency Acquisition Executives to determine
the acquisition strategy for each SO-peculiar program or
88
project. [Ref. 36 :p. 4] The ASD(SO/LIC) function is to
monitor and facilitate DoD level coordination. [Ref. 30]
SO-peculiar items which appear to have joint Service
common applications will normally be submitted to the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) . [Ref. 37] As discussed
earlier, all Major Defense Acquisition (Acquisition Category
I) Programs will be executed by a lead Service or Agency
because of high overhead costs. [Ref. 36 :p. 3] USSOCOM will
assign a Program Monitor to each SOF relevant Category I pro-
gram. [Ref. 36 :p. 3] Programs of lower Acquisition Category,
usually III and IV or NDI, may be managed by USSOCOM "in
house." [Ref. 37]
G. MATERIAL DEVELOPMENT
1 . General Overview
The commander in chief of USSOCOM is the Special
Operations Acquisition Executive (SOAE) . The material
development relationship within USSOCOM is summarized in
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Figure 5-2 : USSOCOM Material Developers
2. J8
Until late in FY 91, SORDAC was a subordinate office
within the Resources Directorate, J8 . [Ref. 30] The Director
of Resources, a flag officer position, provides procurement
support to USSOCOM in the capacity as Head of Contracting
Authority (HCA) . Contracts for direct USSOCOM acquisition and
memoranda with Government engineering centers, therefor, are
negotiated and managed by J8, among its other responsibili-
ties. [Ref. 36 :p. 3] The J8 Directorate currently consists of
the Comptroller and Contracts Divisions. The Comptroller
Division prepares and oversees the USSOCOM budget . The
Contracts Division is responsible for providing overall
support to USSOCOM for goods, services and material, as well
as developing and ensuring compliance with USSOCOM contracting




The head of the Directorate of Special Operations
Research and Development Center (SORDAC) , an SES appointed in
October 1991, is the Special Operations Program Executive
Officer (SOPEO) . The Director has staff responsibility for
the centralized management and monitoring of assigned pro-
grams. All in-house acquisition activities and personnel
report to this official. [Ref. 37]
The function of SORDAC is to provide research,
development, and acquisition support to the activities and
commands of USSOCOM. The SORDAC "plans, directs, reviews, and
evaluates material development and acquisition" upon receipt
of valid requirements developed in the process described
above. [Ref. 36 :p. 7] In reality, this can be divided into
two functions - managing and monitoring acquisition programs
and managing the technology base. The organization and autho-
rized strength of SORDAC is given in the wire diagram in
Appendix L. [Ref. 37]
b) Program Management
Program Managers and Monitors are part of the
Systems Management Division and report directly to the PEO.
As indicated, Program Managers execute selected non-major S0-
peculiar system acquisitions and technological base develop-
ments. Program Monitors evaluate program baselines, strate-
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gies and progress within the framework outlined by executive
agreements between the USSOCOM and other Services and Agen-
cies. The Integration and Analysis Branch provides matrix
support to the Program Managers and Monitors. [Ref. 37]
The Systems Management Division currently has 16
personnel assigned to program management and monitoring. [Ref.
30] On the average, each is responsible for 30 projects.
[Ref. 41]
c) Technology Base
(1) General Overview. The second major function
of SORDAC is to insure that future special operations forces
are equipped at the leading edge of technology. Thus, in
addition to program management, SORDAC executes advanced
technology, low-density, SO-peculiar prototyping through
direct agreements with Government laboratories, universities,
and the private sector. These programs are usually low
dollar, low risk ventures, and may eventually be turned over
to a Service or Agency if research and development results
indicate common Service applications. In addition, a SORDAC
technology base Program Manager (PM-Technology Base) monitors
the technological base efforts of the Service, Agency and
National Laboratory Systems. This enables USSOCOM to take
advantage of non-system specific efforts that have direct SO
application, or might have application if the technological
development is modified. [Ref. 37]
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As stated, MFP-11 funds during the five year
transition period were those "crosswalked" from special
operations programs in the Service and Office of the Secretary
of Defense POMs . This transition of funds to the MFP-11
account, unfortunately, did not include money to establish an
MFP-11 technology base program. [Ref. 29 :p 5]
The funds subsequently made available were
from an ASD(SO/LIC) managed 6 . 3A project called Explosive
Ordinance Disposal - Low Intensity Conflict (EOD-LIC) . [Ref.
29 :p. 15] Most funds in this account had been programmed for
projects at Department of Energy Laboratories or universities;
none had been earmarked for Service engineering centers. [Ref.
29:pp. 22-25] Furthermore, the office of the ASD(SO/LIC) had
no formal process for selecting needs for this budget program
into which USSOCOM could formally integrate SOF requirements
.
[Ref. 29:p. 36]
Nevertheless, the Special Operations Special
Technology (SOST) budget project was initiated in FY 90 to
rapidly transition available technology to SO-peculiar
equipment. [Ref. 29: pp. 22-25] Fiscal Year 92 is the first
year that SORDAC has fully executed its own budget, approxi-
mately $10m of which is designated for technology base
investments. [Ref. 30] USSOCOM technology base programs
relevant to the Soldier System are outlined below.
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(2) Strategy. Soon after the establishment of
USSOCOM, the command realized that provisions for a SOF
technology base program had to be made. The first step was to
appoint a PM-Technology Base in April 1990, and outline the
"guiding principles" of the SOF technology base program to
direct and focus his efforts. [Ref. 29 :p. 9]
These principles essentially shape a five
point technology base strategy. [Ref. 29: pp. 9-14]
First, because of the limited budget, USSOCOM
must aggressively leverage the resources of other DoD technol-
ogy developers in order to increase the impact of MFP-11 funds
on technology development. The House Appropriations Committee
report in June 19 91 on the DoD Appropriations Bill for 1992
stated that the "exploitation of technology that can be used
by Special Operations Forces rests within the technology base
funding provided by the Committee to all Defense research
activities." This statement was supported in conference by
the Senate Appropriations Committee. [Ref. 29 :p. 10]
Second, USSOCOM will foster technology base
teaming at every opportunity. USSOCOM should seek to bring
appropriate Service and DoE labs together to leverage exper-
tise, as well as funded developments, to obtain the best
utilization of resources, and to present SOF requirements.
[Ref. 29:p. 10]
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Third, USSOCOM will develop mechanisms to
maintain a close link between validated user requirements and
specific RDT&E investments, and matrix technology base needs
with the developing community. [Ref . 29 :p. 11] This requires
the PM-Technology Base to develop a USSOCOM Technology Base
Master Plan, integrated with the Modernization Plans of both
the J5-7 and the Services and Federal agencies
.
Fourth, USSOCOM will attempt to influence
the total Government technology development process so that
the SOF mission area can become the demonstration environment
for the early employment of emerging technology. [Ref. 29 :p.
12] USSOCOM seeks to position SOF as a recipient of new
technology so as to evaluate that technology in the SOF
operational mission environment. This will allow laboratories
to gain operational insight on technology developments while
providing an initial capability to SOF. In many cases,
demonstrators or prototypes will fill the need for SOF in a
real world operational environment. [Ref. 29 :p. 14]
Finally, the 6.2 and 6 . 3A funds made avail-
able to SORDAC should be carefully targeted to support the
above four points . Specifically, this means seeking opportu-
nities to "spin-off" technology from the developments of
Service labs or the requirements of other organizations. If
a Service or Agency development is already resourced and a
slight shift in development direction will meet the SOF
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requirement , USSOCOM will negotiate the funding of this shift.
It also means that USSOCOM should try to accelerate technology
developments when the Service priority does not meet the needs
of SOF. This acceleration must be justified by the critical
need of SOF for the capability the provided by the technology
development. [Ref. 29 :p. 13]
In reality, about 7 percent of the SORDAC
technology base funds are 6.3A. These funds have been
programmed equally between proof of principle demonstrators
and ATTDs based primarily on the desire for the initial
hardware from these activities to meet immediate SOF require-
ments. [Ref. 30] Category 6.2 funds have been "spent so as to
shift service efforts to meet SOF needs when Service sponsor's
requirements are slightly different from those of USSOCOM."
[Ref. 29:p. 11]
The second step taken by USSOCOM to create a
viable technology base effort was to establish the Special
Operations Development Program Element in the MFP-11 RDT&E
POM, funded beginning in FY 92. In addition to the previously
established SOST Project, mentioned above, this program
element provides for two new projects, both relevant to the
Army's Soldier System. [Ref. 29 :p. 15]
(3) Soldier System Related Programs
The two technology base budget projects
programmed for start in FY 92 - Special Operations Technology
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Base and Special Operations Medical Research and Development -
are intended to support long term SOF material development.
[Ref. 29:p. 15] Both ought to be integrated into the Army's
Soldier System in order to conform to the stated "guiding
principles .
"
Within the Special Operation Technology Base
account are funds for eight projects directly related or
overlapping with Soldier System RDT&E. Foremost is the $950K
(6.3A) "Joint Technology Base" project for three technology
demonstrators - "Individual Signature Reduction," the "Battle
Dress System, " and "Lower Extremity Assistance for Parachut-
ists (LEAP) . " The signature reduction project is intended to
develop "chameleonic" camouflage clothing to reduce daylight,
thermal and infrared detection. The battle dress system will
incorporate this camouflage into a "complete head-to-foot
battle uniform... of a modular design able to function sepa-
rately or as an integrated unit . " Both are being developed by
the Army's Human Engineering Laboratory (HEL) and Natick RDEC
.
The LEAP project, pursued jointly at Natick RDEC and the
University of Utah, is for an "exoskeletal" device to protect
parachutists with heavy loads. [Ref. 29:pp. 15-22]
The other relevant projects are the $200K
(6.2) concept study for an "Individual Operational Ration" at
Natick RDEC and USARIEM, the $300K (6.3A) contribution to the
C-17 wireless intercom demonstrator at the Air Force Wright
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Laboratories, the $200K (6.2) SOF power source concept study
at Belvior RDEC (to transition into $1.1M under the SOST
project in FY 93), and the $350K (6.3A) "Manportable Non-Line-
of-Sight Weapon System" with the AMC Missile Command (MICOM)
,
Armaments RDEC, and Chemical RDEC. [Ref. 29:pp. 15-22]
The Special Operations Medical Research and
Development Project, underfunded at $2 99K in FY 92 and
earmarked to support validated Navy requirements, stands to
benefit greatly from integration with the Soldier System. As
part of the ASB study, the Army Surgeon General's Director,
Medical R&D Planning formally offered to assist USSOCOM in
developing an SOF Medical Modernization Plan and medical input
into the SOF Technology Base Master Plan. [Ref. 29 :p. 26]
This is further discussed in Chapter VI (Conclusions)
.
H. CURRENT DA-SORDAC CONTACTS
1 . SO/LIC Coordinating Group
In February 1990, the Army established a "SO/LIC
Technology Base Coordinating Group" to identify long term
capability requirements in future Low Intensity Conflicts.
Chaired by the AMC Technology Planning Management Office,
additional voting members were from TRADOC headquarters, the
office of the ASD (SO/LIC) , USAICS, JFKSWCS, and USSOCOM. [Ref.
29 :p. 39] USSOCOM, represented by the PM-Technology Base,
presented 37 desired capabilities, 32 of which were accepted
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as joint desired capabilities for the Army and SOF . The other
five were considered SO-peculiar, but the membership chose to
allow them to be considered for development by the Army
technology base community. [Ref. 29 :p. 39] All 37 desired
capabilities were briefed to the Army labs and RDECs, who then
provided technology development plans for each initiative.
[Ref. 29 :p. 39] During this process, the Coordinating Group
Chair informed the participating labs and RDECs that $700K was
immediately available from AMC Technology Base funds for
initiating or accelerating developments. They were also told
that the Group would recommend to the TBAG those projects that
warrant continued funding or require addition resources. [Ref.
29:p. 39]
In August 1990, the 32 proposals were reduced to 10
projects for presentation to the TBAG for funding support.
Unfortunately, Operation Desert Shield took all the Army funds
for this effort and the Group Chairman became the AMC Desert
Shield/Desert Storm Project Officer. MG Harrison, the current
CG, LABCOM, and Director, AMC Technology Planning and Manage-
ment, has stated that he will reestablish the SO/LIC Coordi-
nating Group as soon as USSOCOM has developed modernization
and technology base master plans. [Ref. 29 :p. 40]
Although disbanded at this time, the SO/LIC Coordinat-
ing Group brought the Army light forces, the Soldier System
technology base community, and SOF together to develop and
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review desired capabilities for the future. It proved to the
Army requirement and the technology base developers that SOF
requirements could be merged with those of the Army. [Ref . 30]
2 . Army Technology Base Master Plan
During the sessions of the Army SO/LIC Technology Base
Coordinating Group, the USSOCOM representative suggested that
special operations be included in the next Army Technology
Base Master Plan (ATBMP) . [Ref. 30] It was determined that by
allowing USSOCOM to participate in the coordination of the
ATBMP, SOF co-sponsorship for particular Army technologies
could assist in the funding decision process, adding emphasis
to those technologies supporting the individual soldier or
light forces capability development. [Ref. 29 :p. 40] There-
for, since the staffing of the FY 91 ATBMP, the USSOCOM PM-
Technology Base has been the Army point of contact for
inclusion of SOF technology development needs. Special
Operations is now formally recognized in the ATBMP as an Army
Battlefield Capability Package. This will lead to Army
support for common technology base developments because each
functional area (aviation, C3I, etc.) is now linked to SOF
technology base requirements . SOF needs will appear in the
Army long range plan, provided J5-7 and J3-R can develop and
validate SOF modernization plans in sync with the Army combat
development process. [Ref. 29 :p. 40]
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3. TBESC Membership
In February 1991, USSOCOM participation on the SO/LIC
group also led to an invitation from AMC for SORDAC to
formally sit on the Army's Technology Base Executive Steering
Committee (TBESC) for the Soldier System. The USSOCOM PM-
Technology Base has represented SOF on the TBESC since April
1991. [Ref. 30]
4
. Army Science Board Input
These developments led GEN Lindsay (Ret.), advisor to
the ASB and former commander in chief of USSOCOM, to request
a formal USSOCOM briefing to the ASB Soldier System study.
The USSOCOM technology base PM was subsequently appointed as
a Special Assistant to the ASB for this study. The result for
USSOCOM was the ASB finding that SOF requirements for technol-
ogy development may be the most difficult, and therefor should
be considered as the "mark on the wall" for Army Soldier
System RDT&E. [Ref. 29 :p. 41] In addition, this presence
reinforced USSOCOM efforts to encourage cooperation between
TSM-Soldier, the relevant TRADOC combat development centers,
the AMC and USAMRDC laboratories and engineering centers, and
JFKSWCS . Each is now studying SOF and soldier requirements
for the purpose of merging desired future capabilities. [Ref.
29:p. 42]
Another positive aspect of USSOCOM involvement with
the ASB study has been to strengthen the medical RDT&E
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relationship between the Army and USSOCOM Command Surgeon's
office. The Command Surgeon was subsequently visited by Army
medical RDT&E planners and invited into the Army Soldier
System medical technology base planning process to present SOF
medical requirements. Again, as coordination continues, the
SOF medical requirements may become the marks on the wall.
Prospects for success are discussed in the next chapter.
[Ref. 29:p. 42]
5 . SMP Annex
Another benefit of USSOCOM participation on the ASB
study was TRADOC permission to include an SOF Annex to the
Soldier Modernization Plan. Preparation of this annex has not
only reinforced the integration of SOF requirements into the
Army's long range technology plans, but also has the addition-
al benefits of establishing more direct channels into Army
combat developments and facilitating the emergence of a
functional USSOCOM validation process. [Ref. 30] JFKSWCS was
authorized to directly coordinate with TSM-Soldier, USAICS,
and USAAVCS to develop the document; the USSOCOM J3-R would
validate the final draft and insure its integration into the
Modernization Plans being developed by J5-7 . The next steps
in this process are discussed in Chapter VI.
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6 . Other Contacts
Two other technology interfaces have been established
subsequent to the DA-USSOCOM Memorandum of Agreement.
The "Board of Army Science and Technology/Science and
Technology for the Army (BAST/STAR) Study" is a comprehensive
Army study to identify all capabilities and technologies that
should be pursued in the 1990s to transition the Army into the
21st Century. [Ref. 29 :p. 44] The Director, SORDAC, has
served as the SOF representative on the Special Technology
Panel since October 1989. The USSOCOM objective is to balance
the study's efforts in reviewing light, heavy, and special
operations forces modernization. A draft BAST/STAR report was
prepared after Operation Just Cause, but is undergoing almost
total revision based on world events of the past 18 months.
[Ref. 29:p. 45]
Finally, early in USSOCOM efforts to establish a SOF
technology base and forge links with the Army, it was decided
that an Army "FAST Team" should be requested for USSOCOM. An
Army Field Assistance in Science and Technology Team is
designed to coordinate quick reaction requirements for
demonstrators and prototypes with the AMC. It is normally
composed of a GM-15 science advisor, a secretary, and a GS-
13/14 technical assistant, and assigned to Army Corps level
units. AMC offered to have a FAST Team assigned to USSOCOM in
June 1990, but several developments prevented its actual
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arrival. The action is still being staffed. Two solutions
are possible. Either the FAST Team currently at Fort Bragg
will be split between USSOCOM and the Army's XVIIIth Airborne
Corps, or a FAST Team currently assigned in Europe will be





Many within the SOF community have long criticized the
Army's process for equipping the individual soldier. Two
perceptions have been especially antagonistic. The first of
these is that the needs of special operations forces do not
matter to the Army. The second of these is that the Army
spends a great deal on research and development, but individu-
al soldiers seldom benefit. They still carry the load bearing
equipment used in the Korean War. Special ire is directed at
Natick RDEC, which "puts 200 different pairs of boots on its
shelves but none on our feet." It appears that the Army is
trying to change this, and USSOCOM should be made aware of
these changes and take advantage of them.
The objective of this thesis is to provide the USSOCOM
technology base program manager with an unclassified reference
document on the Army's "Soldier System," the collective term
for these Army changes. This chapter presents findings
answering the research questions, and offers analysis and
recommendations for USSOCOM consideration.
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B. FINDINGS
1 . Soldier System Concept
• "The Soldier System" is a management initiative within the
Army to bring the proven DoD "systems approach" to the
acquisition of items used in combat by the individual
soldier.
• The working definition of the Soldier System is "every-
thing a soldier wears, carries, or consumes for personal
use in a tactical environment" plus items that "affect the
soldier's quality of life in the field."
• For soldier items, application of the systems approach
requires a significant reorganization of the Army's
traditional process of developing and managing material
programs
.
• The most ambitious reorganization, recommended by the Army
Science Board, is for a General officer program manager
directly reporting to the Army Acquisition Executive.
This "PM-Soldier" would supervise the current program
offices for Clothing and Individual Equipment and the 9mm
Handgun, as well as two newly created offices, PM-NBC
Protection and PM-Field Services.
• The Army's approach is to develop the Soldier System in
"modules" (integrated helmet, individual weapon, body
armor, etc.), each capable of operating separately or
together with the other modules
.
• The most revolutionary aspect of the Soldier System is the
"skin-in, skin-out" approach to development. Pharmaceuti-
cal provided performance enhancement, bio-technical NBC
protection, under-the-skin sensors, field rations, and
traditional soldier hardware will be integrated in one
development program.
2 . Soldier System Requirement Development
Articulating material requirements for items encompassed
by the Soldier System has traditionally been the responsi-
bility of TRADOC, as validated by the DCSOPS for most
items other than CIE and medical; the Army Clothing and
Equipment Board (ACEB) , as validated by the DCSLOG, for
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CIE items; and, for medical items, the US Army Health
Services Command (USAHSC) , as validated by the Army
Surgeon General
.
• The Army is currently centralizing these responsibilities
to the TRADOC Systems Manager (TSM) Soldier. The proposed
Soldier Modernization Plan (SMP) , compiled by TSM-Soldier
for signature by the Army Chief of Staff, is to be the
guiding document for all future Soldier System combat and
material development
.
• The SMP, however, is not a "pure" material document. In
order to charter "PM-Soldier, " elements of the SMP must be
further analyzed and refined into an Operational Require-
ments Document (ORD)
• Aside from the current budget climate, the primary
obstacle to rapid development of a soldier System ORD is
inadequate intelligence analysis prioritizing the likely
threats to the dismounted soldier on the future battle-
field. Such analysis was initiated in October 1991.
Soldier System Technology Base
• There are currently prototype demonstrators in Army
laboratories that can provide significant increases in the
combat capabilities of the individual SOF soldier.
• Collectively, these demonstrators are referred to as the
"Block I Soldier, " and are programmed for Engineering and
Manufacturing Development beginning in FY 94
.
• Near-term "leap ahead" advances are possible in the areas
of Global Positioning, C3, aural sensors, and chemical-
biological protection.
• Army management of Soldier System technology base develop-
ment lacks a central focal point . The Soldier System
TBESC provides a forum for coordination, but does not
control funding, and subsequently cannot make programmatic
decisions. The Director, AMC Technology Planning Manage-
ment is the commander of LABCOM, but does not control PM-
CIE. PM-CIE has RDT&E responsibility for CIE, including
the Block I Soldier "cornerstone" SIPE ATTD program, and
sets policy for Natick RDEC. The full scope of the
Soldier System, however, is much broader than just CIE,
and PM-CIE has additional non-Soldier System responsibili-
ties. Soldier System medical technology base research is
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• In reality, much of the current Soldier System related
technology base research is at the discretion of at least
10 different Army research centers.
• Current research lacks both a "peer review" process and
firm links to the requirement development process. The
ASB found that most current research is dominated by
"parochial interest," primarily of Natick RDEC.
Soldier System Program Management
• There is currently no single Soldier System material
developer.
• PM-CIE, in addition to supervising CIE RDT&E, has acquisi-
tion and life-cycle management responsibility for all Army
CIE. PM-CIE managed programs are reviewed by the old
DCSLOG chaired Army Clothing and Equipment Board (ACEB)
,
not the ASARC, and subject to the unique acquisition
provisions of AR 700-86.
• The management of non-CIE Soldier System projects is
widely dispersed across the PEO and AMC program management
structure, and governed by AR 70-1.
• Several Army studies over the last 24 months have recom-
mended that a single Soldier System material developer be
chartered. Most significant of these studies was the ASB,
as mentioned above. This step is still pending, although
a decision might be made in March 1992.
5 . Soldier System Funding
• There is no central control of funding for the Soldier
System.
• Assessments of the total current investment programmed for
the Soldier System vary widely. RDT&E for FY 92-98 is
calculated between $278 million to $1,074 billion,
depending on system definition. Programmed Procurement
spending for this period is between $718 million and
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$1,359 billion. The higher amounts are from the SMP, the
most current source of information.
• By these assessments, a Soldier System program office
would have to chartered as a DoD Major System.
6 . Emerging Army Process
• TSM-Soldier is fully established as the focal point for
Soldier System requirement development
.
• The draft SMP has been in use for over 12 months . The SMP
is being updated to incorporate "quality of life" issues
raised after Desert Shield/Storm, and should be signed by
the Chief of Staff in March.
• Because of the lack of an ORD, the Army is at least 12
months away from a chartered Soldier System program
office
.
• Appointment of a Special Task Force to develop the ORD,
therefore, is the most likely next step towards a single
material developer.
• The conflicting requirement validation, program control,
and funding responsibilities between AR 70-1 and AR 700-86
must be resolved in order for PM-CIE to be integrated into
a Soldier System management office.
7 . USSOCOM Acquisition Strategy
• USSOCOM is vested with responsibilities for the combat
development, requirement validation, acquisition and
funding of items used exclusively or urgently needed by
its assigned forces.
• USSOCOM has implemented a sound strategy for material
development to meet validated needs "crosswalked" from the
Services
.
• For USSOCOM to fully "maximize" its acquisition authority,
it must develop interface channels into the acquisition
processes of the Services. In addition to "top-level"
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Service material developers, this means establishing links
to combat developers and technology base planners
.
• Until very recently, less emphasis has been placed on
long-term systematic modernization planning to integrate
SOF needs with the combat development and technology base
plans of the Services, or to execute internal channels for
requirement validation.
• USSOCOM has articulated a particularly clever technology
base strategy. Because of the "growing pains" of the
USSOCOM acquisition process, this strategy has not yet
been fully implemented.
8 . USSOCOM Acquisition Process
• As intended by Congress, the establishment of USSOCOM has
significantly altered the acquisition process for items
used by SOF.
• The emerging USSOCOM acquisition process promises to meet
the long-term Congressional intent of institutionalizing
a high level of material readiness for SOF.
• The primary weakness of USSOCOM acquisition to date has
been in establishing effective channels for long—term
combat development and requirement validation.
• For the Soldier System, one aspect of this weakness has
been the "growing pains" of integrating the various combat
development channels transferred to USSOCOM control . The
JFKSWCS-USASOC-USSOCOM roles have been established slowly.
• Another aspect of this weakness has been redefining the
relationship between JFKSWCS, USASOC and TRADOC for
coordinating combat developments.
• A third aspect of this weakness has been integrating the






Current: USSOCOM-Soldier System Interfaces
• Army Soldier System developers are very receptive to
integrating SOF requirements into Army plans.
• Reasons for this receptiveness include "institutional
memory" of the key individuals at USAICS and TSM-Soldier,
the perception that many SOF requirements are more
"justifiable" to Congress in the current budget climate,
Army desire to pool all available resources to maintain
programs, and professional recognition that a significant
capability requirement overlap exists for SOF and light
infantry
.
• In addition to the formal top-level DA-USSOCOM MOA for
program management, other channels have been opened in the
last 18 months. The most significant of these have been
the SO/LIC Coordinating Group, SOF input into the Army
Technology Base Master Plan, USSOCOM participation in the
ASB Soldier System study, and submission of a draft SOF
Annex to the SMP
.
• Contacts have been established with the Army medical
acquisition community that promise additional long-term
increases in SOF capabilities. In the short-run, these
contacts can improve the quality of the current USSOCOM
acquisition plans
.
C. ANALYSIS: FUTURE PROSPECTS
1 . Soldier System Prospects
USSOCOM has expressed two concerns about the Soldier
System. One is that the Army might not carry through the
required organization. The other is that the needs of the SOF
soldier might still receive low priority within the Army
Soldier System program. Both fears are well justified
historically, but neither should inhibit USSOCOM enthusiasm
for the Soldier System.
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The principal ambiguity in the current Army plan is
the Soldier System definition. The original focus was to
develop a head-to-foot combat system - integrated C3, weapon,
body armor, uniform and load bearing equipment. This is what
Army SOF has long desired. Since the Gulf War, this concept
has grown to include "quality of life issues," defined by the
Chief of Staff to encompass all Army soldiers, field services,
medical care, and rations. As Army plans are being rewritten
to reflect this broader definition, it is not clear what sort
of material development office will be established to manage
the program.
A single material manager to accomplish the original
focus, however, will certainly be found somewhere in the new
structure. It will probably be built around the current PM-
CIE, rechartered for ASA(RDA)/AAE program control. The head-
to-foot Block I Soldier, furthermore, is the least risky
aspect of the Soldier System program concept, and therefor the
most likely to transition to development in the current budget
climate. The chances that the Army will not change its
traditional non-systems approach to individual soldier items
is small.
The concern that SOF needs will remain a low priority
ought to be a reason for increased USSOCOM interest in the
program at these early stages. This is discussed in detail
below. Years from now it is possible that infantry and SOF
needs will diverge. Light infantry, for example, may desire
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increased ballistic protection and SOF increased chameleonic
camouflage from the same field jacket. Right now, combat
soldiers from every community ought to work together to
establish a program capable of bringing about such choices.
The Army's programmed FY 92 RDT&E expenditures for the Soldier
System are greater than the entire MFP-11 RDT&E budget. For
USSOCOM, there is much less risk involved by working with the
Army than attempting such a development alone.
2. USSOCOM Prospects
Reliance on top-level acquisition channels, character-
ized by the DA-USSOCOM Memorandum of Agreement and JROC
process, are not the most effective mechanisms for USSOCOM to
influence the Army's emerging Soldier System acquisition
process. It would be far more effective to interject SOF
needs into the Army' s long-term acquisition plans as early in
the process as possible, to maintain open and multiple
channels of communication throughout the requirement develop-
ment cycle, and to implement the SOF technology base strategy.
After these steps, USSOCOM can use its top-level authority to
appoint a program monitor and participate on the Soldier
System ASARC.
One option for USSOCOM to accomplish such a close
involvement with the Soldier System is to push for its
designation as a Joint Program under Part 12, Section B of DoD
5000.2.
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Contacts established over the last 18 months, however,
have opened the possibility for USSOCOM to achieve the same
objectives within the current Army structure.
As established by the SO/LIC Coordinating Group and
ASB, "SO-peculiar" for the Soldier System really means "level
of capability" or "urgency of need" rather than a unique piece
of equipment. The Army's senior leadership has concluded that
Army SOF requires the highest level of capability. The
Soldier System ORD will articulate these requirements,
provided USSOCOM can effectively communicate them to the
Army's combat developers and technology base managers.
The first step to accomplish this, already recognized
by USSOCOM and outside the scope of this thesis, is eliminat-
ing the backlog of unvalidated requirements and plans in the
J3-R. Other steps must follow. To start, the USSOCOM staff
directorates with modernization planning responsibilities must
complete their plans in order for SOF modernization plans to
be matrixed with those of the Services. Furthermore, without
these SOF modernization plans SORDAC cannot realistically
develop a SOF technology base master plan to matrix with the
Service master plans. Without matrixing all such plans,
overlapping capability requirements simply cannot be identi-
fied. Without such identification, it is not possible to
prioritize SOF needs within the Services.
Likewise, USSOCOM requirement developers and re-
sourcers should realize that it is validated modernization
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objectives, not mission need statements, that the SOF technol-
ogy base program manager needs in order to leverage the
Services' technology base communities. In the Army, there is
extensive technology base input into the combat development
process, and funds are made available for "non-systems" and
collaborative research prior to mission need statement
approval. If USSOCOM is to have a technology base program -
and it is essential that it does in order to accomplish the
stated acquisition objectives - it must give its technology
base manager similar responsibilities. JFKSWCS and USASOC
cannot prepare requirements documents without knowledge of the
current technology base, managed at USSOCOM. Although a few
well-invested MFP-11 dollars can leverage a much larger amount
of Service funding, the Service laboratories will not work for
USSOCOM for free.
Over the past 18 months, USSOCOM has taken the
important first steps to interface directly with the Army's
technology base, highlighted by input into the Army's Technol-
ogy Base Master Plan and membership on the Soldier System
TBESC. The next steps, therefor, require thorough USSOCOM
planning.
Additionally, the best long-run mechanism to leverage
Army acquisition and insure equipment interoperability might
be iterative Army SOF input into Army combat developments
.
Initial matrixing of USSOCOM modernization plans with Army
master documents is important, but TRADOC's CAC and CASCOM
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perform a critical on-going integration function within the
Army one level below TRADOC headquarters. JFKSWCS is the
appropriate USSOCOM asset for iterative participation in this
process. USSOCOM authority to validate Army SOF combat
developments should be viewed as similar to Army DCSOPS
responsibility to validate TRADOC requirements - it should not
be used to inhibit information sharing. The caveat is that
J3-R must also integrate SOF requirements identified by non-
Army SOF channels, and must insure that these needs are
communicated when necessary to the Army as well.
Under the current DA-USSOCOM MOA, however, there is no
mechanism to insure such iterative SOF input into Army combat
developments. TSM-Soldier had been established nearly 18
months, and the draft SMP in use for almost one year, before
a draft SOF Annex to the Soldier System modernization plan was
submitted. One option to prevent such slow response in the
future would be a USASOC-TRADOC combat development MOA
providing for standing JFKSWCS participation in the TRADOC
process . For the Soldier System, such an agreement should be
expanded to specifically include the JFKSWCS relationship to
TSM-Soldier. As the J3-R validation backlog is reduced,
JFKSWCS-J3-R interface should become smoother, further
reducing SOF response time. Top-level submission of an
Operational Needs Statement to the JROC can be used as an
option of last resort when USSOCOM-TRADOC interface fails to
meet a validated SOF need. Two other options to be considered
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are negotiating USSOCOM representation on the CIE Army
Clothing and Equipment Board and Clothing Advisory Group, and
on the Soldier System Special Task Force, when one is desig-
nated.
The top-level authorities outlined in the DA-USSOCOM
MOA are most useful only after the decision to establish a
material development program. Under this agreement, USSOCOM
should seek membership on PM-Soldier' s ASARC, and appoint a
program monitor for the Soldier System.
Two other aspects of the Soldier System, furthermore,
offer unique opportunities to USSOCOM. The SOF technology
base strategy seeks to establish USSOCOM units as a "technolo-
gy test bed" in order both to satisfy immediate requirements
and to maintain SOF capability on the leading edge of technol-
ogy. The modular systems architecture of the Block I Soldier
is ideally suited to this goal. This low-volume modular
prototype test and fielding concept, furthermore, dovetails
with the emerging long-range DoD acquisition guidance, and the
Army strategy of fielding new equipment beginning with "first
to fight" units. USSOCOM should vigorously pursue the
application of this strategy to the Soldier System, to include
senior command interface with the Army to include SOF units in
the system test plan.
Second, the most revolutionary aspect of the Soldier
System is the "skin-in, skin-out" approach suggested by the
former SOF technology base manager. Army inclusion of
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psychological and internal medicine considerations in a
material system may prove unrealistic in the long-run, but it
offers the immediate possibility of leveraging the Army to
accomplish other USSOCOM objectives . Foremost among these
objectives is establishing long-term interfaces with the
Army's medical combat development and technology base communi-
ties, similar to those being forged with TRADOC and the AMC
technology base. Another is overcoming the shortcomings of
the "crosswalk" of medical funds and personnel. USSOCOM has
been left underfunded and unable to perform long-range medical
modernization planning. Contacts and plans established now
should transcend the eventual resolution of the degree of
medical involvement in the Soldier System. Again, an opportu-
nity exists to use the Soldier System as a mechanism to
significantly improve the long-term USSOCOM acquisition
process
.
In summary, USSOCOM should consider that few things
excite its soldiers more than the quality and suitability of
the equipment issued. Shortcomings in the traditional United
States approach to equipping SOF led directly to the acquisi-
tion responsibilities of USSOCOM. A confluence of subsequent
events - feedback from the Gulf War, collapse of the Soviet
Union, declining defense budgets, a new DoD acquisition
strategy, and the Army's emerging Soldier System approach -
are transforming the Army' s process for acquiring individual
soldier items . The maintenance of concurrent and reinforcing
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combat development, technology base, and top-level program
management interface channels with the Soldier System is the
most effective way to influence the Army's process to meet SOF
needs
.
The principal concern of the Researcher - an Army
Special Forces officer recently assessed into the Acquisition




• Complete the SOF modernization plans.
• Matrix the SOF modernization plans with the Army's plans
to identify capability requirement overlaps.
• Provide funds to execute the SOF technology base strategy
for Soldier System items.
• Negotiate a Memorandum of Agreement defining the combat
development relationships between Army SOF and TRADOC.
• After the Army designates a Soldier System material
development office, use top-level channels to establish
USSOCOM representation on the system ASARC and appoint a
program monitor.
• Consider the Soldier System for Joint Program status.
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APPENDIX A
SOLDIER SYSTEM ACQUISITION "ROADMAP"
SOLDIER MODERNIZATION ROADMAP
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SMP ORGANIZATION AND PROPONENTS
The draft SMP consists of eight chapters (a total of less
than 30 pages) and nine Annexes compiled by the TRADOC Soldier
System Manager (TSM-Soldier) . The purpose of each Annex is to
provide a single document summarizing all aspects of modern-
ization within the subject area, including requirements,
material and nonmaterial solutions.
The draft of a tenth annex, Annex J (Special Operations




Chapter 3 Advanced Concept
Chapter 4 Modernization
Requirements
Chapter 5 Assessment of Current
and Future Capabilities
Chapter 6 Soldier System Strategy
Chapter 7 Program Resources
Chapter 8 Conclusions
Annex A Dismounted Soldier
Annex B Combat Crew (Mounted)
Annex C Combat Crew (Air)
Annex D Soldiers - All Others
Annex E Field Services



























CIE DEFINITION (AR 700-86)
CIE includes most Army uniforms, insignia and accessories
worn on or with required clothing. It specifically includes
the initial and all supplemental items issued to enlisted
soldiers under Common Table of Allowances (CTA) 50-900,
including all individual and organizational items with
ownership retained by the Army. In addition to actual
uniforms and boots, this includes load bearing equipment,
canteens, first aid and ammunition pouches, helmets, protec-
tive goggles (laser and ballistic) , and NBC and cold weather
clothing. CIE, furthermore, encompasses the required uniforms
for officers and optional uniforms for all soldiers outlined
in AR 670-1, and the issue of centrally procured heraldic
items. In total, this covers the Army's 12 "utility", three
"service" ("Greens"), and 9 dress uniforms.
CIE, however, does not include medical clothing and
equipment (listed in CTA 8-100) , or Life Support Equipment
considered as a component of a major weapon system, such as
flame retardant vehicle crewmen clothing. Nor does it include
"other items as determined by the Department of the Army and
so directed after proper Army Staff coordination."
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APPENDIX D
ARMY MILESTONE DECISION AUTHORITIES (AR 70-1)
Table 5-1
Army materiel acquisition program categories and decision authorities
Program type and category Program management Milestone review tonjm Program decision authority
MDAP
DAB level PEO/PM







ADAP PEO/PM ASARC AAE
Nonmajor level 1 PEO/PM IPR PEO
Nonmajor level II Project officers or equivalent
(designated by MATDEV)
IPR MATDEV Commander
Nonmajor level III Systems manager, commodity




All levels are governed by the principles ol AR 70-1; however, the MATDEV may tailor the disciplined management review
accountability for systems is maintained.
forums for levels II and III providing that full
Table 3-1
Milestone review considerations (see note)
Milestone
—Enter concept exploration/definition phase.
I—Enter concept demonstration/validation
phase
II—Enter full-scale development (and LRIP)
phase. (MIA may be required prior to III)
Review considerations
Technology assessment; continuing MAA/requirements validation; nondevelopment/new
development alternatives; life-cycle cost/affordability/stability; tailored strategy; industrial base;
foreign cooperative opportunities; and operational utility assessment.
Threat assessment; program alternatives/tradeoffs; performance-cost-schedule trade-off
strategy; acquisition streamlining/strategy; prototyping plan; affordability and life-cycle cost;
potential common-use solutions; and cooperative development opportunities.
DAB committee before final RFP release; DAB review belore contract award; affordability/cosl-
benefit/stability; risk vs. capability/criticality; production transition planning, surge/mobilization
capability; common-use potential; demonstration-validation results; milestone authorization;
MANPRINT; procurement/competition strategy; ILS planning: associated C3I/COMSEC; specific
cost/performance goals/thresholds; acquisition streamlining; design-to-cost; and LRIP/LLT
requirements.
II—Enter full-rate production phase.
IV—Logistics Readiness and Support Review
(1-2 years after FUE).
Results ol FSD phase; OT&E results; threat validation; cost verification and affordability;
production and deployment schedule; RAM and ILS; producibility verification; realistic surge/
mobilization capability; multiyear procurement/milestone authorization; MANPRINT; and
associated C3I/COMSEC.
Logistics readiness/sustainability; weapons support objectives; ILS implementation; efficient/
cost-effective logistic support activities; displaced equipment disposition; and affordability/life-
cycle cost.
V—Upgrade/Replacement Review (5-10 years
after FUE).
Continued capability to meet mission needs; need for upgrade/useful life extension; threat
change; technology assessments; displaced equipment disposition; and major modification vs.
retirement vs new start alternatives.
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APPENDIX E
SPECIAL TASK FORCE/STUDY GROUPS (AR 70-1)
Table 4-1
Composition of special task force
Position: Director
Source: Best qualified oflicer in grade 06 or
higher or civilian equivalent (PM designee
excluded). For major systems and designated
acquisition programs, Director STF or SSG will
manage program between POM approval of
the new start and completion of the Milestone
I decision review. STF or SSG will be
terminated at the discretion of the convening
authority.
Position: Project manager (Designee)
Source: Designee and individual.
Position: Materiel developer
Source: As designated by DA (such as, AMC,
COE, TSG. and PM). (Contingent may include




Position: User (as required)











Source: Military Traffic Management




381-19 and AR 381-11).
Position: Operational tester
Source: OTEA or other designated tester.
Position: Development tester and evaluator
Source: Normally, United States Army Test
and Evaluation Command (TECOM) and Army
Materiel Systems Analysis Agency (AMSAA).
Position: Manpower/personnel support




DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY SECRETARIAT AND STAFF
FUNCTIONS: AR 70-1
Chapter 2, AR 70-1, details the duties and responsibili-
ties of the key individuals and organizations within the Army
acquisition framework, further delineating those established
in the AR-10 series. These responsibilities are discussed in
detail below. Responsibilities under AR 700-86 are in Section
E (CIE) .
Headquarters, Department of the Army
ASA (RDA)
The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Develop-
ment, and Acquisition) (ASA (RDA)) - currently also the AAE -
is the focal point for determining program planning and
funding, and providing staff "direction and control" on
matters involving "research development, and acquisition;
technical test and evaluation; procurement policy and proce-
dures, competition and acquisition streamlining advocacy, and
program/contractor reporting." [Ref. 21 :p. 7] The ASA (RDA)
schedules all major program reviews. The ASA (RDA) staff and
advisory committees assist in this overall supervisory
function. For the Soldier System, the most important ASA (RDA)
representative is the Technology Base Executive Steering
Committee (TBESC) , discussed below in greater detail.
ASA(FM)
The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management)
(ASA(FM)), in coordination with the ASA (RDA), receives and
consolidates all RDT&E and procurement requests for integra-
tion into the Army Budget, and prepares the documents required
to manage Army funds. In addition, the office of the ASA(FM)
prepares the Independent Cost Estimate and establishes the
Acquisition Category designation for inclosure into the
program baseline.
DCSOPS
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
(DCSOPS) has Army staff responsibility to develop Army policy
and guidance for all combat developments and material require-
ments . This includes validating requirements, overall force
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structure and design, force integration and modernization,
PPBS priorities, and user testing.
DCSLOG / ASA(ISL)
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) and
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Logistics)
(ASA(I&L)) have responsibility for the logistical acceptabili-
ty, interoperability, and supportability of material systems.
The DCSLOG is the functional proponent for logistics related
OMA funds and the acquisition of spares, and the Director of
the Army Stock Fund.
DCSPER / ASA(MRA)
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) and
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)
are responsible for the overseeing Army MANPRINT and Soldier
Oriented Research and Development (SORD) Programs, and




The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT)
approves and validates threat documentation for all MDAP's and
ADAP's, including obtaining Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
documentation, and is responsible for threat integration
support of Army acquisition programs.
DUSA(OR)
The Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (Operations
Research) (DUSA(OR)) is responsible for Army test and evalua-
tion of both combat and material developments, and, in
coordination with the DCSOPS, manages all user test programs.
Surgeon General
The Surgeon General (TSG) is responsible for Medical
Readiness and Health Care Programs within the Army. This
includes acting as a focal point for medical related combat
and material developments, directly executing assigned Medical
Readiness and Health Care Programs, and ensuring that all
subordinate agencies involved in systems acquisition provide
responsive functional support to Army programs
.
DPAE
The Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation (DPAE)
develops Program Objective Memoranda (POM's), including
resource guidance; conducts affordability assessments to
support major decision reviews (ASARC and DAB's); maintains
the Army portion of the Five-Year Defense Program (FYDP) and
manages the programming phase of the PPBS; and ensures the
"overall discipline of the PPBS".
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JAG
The Judge Advocate General (JAG) reviews the legality of
the acquisition and intended combat use of each material and
weapon system.
Other Army Commands and Agencies
The two primary Major Commands (MACOMS) with acquisition
responsibilities in the Army are the Army Material Command
(AMC) and Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) . Each has
several subordinate commands with prominent acquisition roles.
Six other MACOMS have specific acquisition authorities within
their purview, as outlined in AR 70-1. The only one of these
directly relevant to the Soldier System is the Army Health
Service Command (USAHSC) . The responsibilities of AMC, TRADOC
and USAHSC are discussed in detail in Chapter 3, along with
the US Army Medical Research and Development Command (USAMRDC)
and the US Army Medical Material Agency (USAMMA) . In addition,
several other independent Army elements have ancillary
responsibilities. For the Soldier System, these include the
Army Operational Test and Evaluation Agency (OTEA) , the US
Army Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA) , the Army Nuclear and




The Army Operational Test and Evaluation Agency (OTEA) is
responsible for the management of all Army Operational Test
and evaluation (OT&E) , as well as other specified test
programs, including OSD-directed joint user testing, and




The US Army Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA) assists the




The US Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency (USANCA) estab-
lishes and monitors NBC contamination and survivability
criteria, and assist combat developers in applying these
criteria to requirements development.
USALEA
The US Army Logistics Evaluation Agency (USALEA) is the
logistician for all Army non-medical acquisition, including
preparing the independent integrated logistic support analy-
sis, and "participating" in the development of Request for





SOLDIER SYSTEM TBESC MEMBERSHIP AND PURPOSE
Membership
ASA(RDA) Representative
AMC Technology Base Manager
Technical Director, CECOM
Directors of each of the 10 AMC RDT&E Facilities conduct-
ing Soldier System research (See Appendix H)
TSM-Soldier
PM-CIE
USAMRDC Technology Base Manager
Technical Director, US Army Research Institute (ARI)
Chairman, Battlefield Support, AMC
USSOCOM Technology Base Manager
Purpose
• Focus and minimize overlap in Army Soldier System
technology base projects.
• Develop the Technology Base/Major System "Roadmap" for the
Soldier System.
• Identify "leap ahead" technologies, technology barriers,
program linkages, opportunities for research leveraging,
and funding shortfalls.













Harry Diamond Labs (HDL)
Human Engineering Lab (HEL)




































Army Clothing and Equipment Board (ACEB)
4-1. Establishment
Die ACEB is established as a continuing intra-Army board in
the life cycle management of organizational clothing and indi-
vidual equipment, personal clothing (service, dress, and distinc-
tive uniforms); optional clothing; associated heraldic items; and
uniforms included in the initial clothing allowance (clothing
bag items).
4-2. Mission
n The ACED will review the requirement documents for
any new or improved CtE described in paragraph 1-4, recom-
. mended by the CAG for development and introduction into
the Army supply system.
b The ACED will also review policies pertaining to the
wear of new or improved clothing and heraldic items.
4-3. Composition
n Willi the exception of the Commander, US Army Troop
Support Command (CDR, TROSCOM) representing the mate-
rial developer and TRADOC members representing the
combat developer, the ACED will consist of voting members
assigned to the Army Staff. The board will be chaired by the
DCSLOG. The board will consist of the voting members listed
below. Each of the members will nominate a senior ranking al-
ternate who will serve in his or her absence.
(1) DCSLOG—chairperson.
(2) DCSPER.
(3) Deputy Inspector General




(B) DEPUTY CHIEF of STAFF for Combat Develop-
ments, TRADOC.
(9) GG, TROSCOM.
(10) Senior female' officer on the Army General or Special
Staff.
(II)SMA.
b. Additions to the voting membership must be approved by
the chairperson.
c. Technical advisers, those without vote, will include the
Chief, Army Nurse Corps (if not the senior female officer on
the Army Staff), the Director or the Army Dudget, Office of
the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve
Affairs), Office of the Surgeon General, PM-CIE, AMC re-
seaich and development laboratory, TIOII, AAEES, and







a. The CAG consists of representatives from select
MACOMs and key Army organizations, all with equal vote,
presents the user community with an opportunity to express
quirements and needs, thereby assuring that desired C1E ite
are pursued from concept to issue A primary purpose of I
CAG is to assure validation of need before initiating develr
rnent of an item and subsequently, to affirm that the item r
veloped is acceptable for use by the irser community.
h. TRADOC (ATCD-SE) will administer the CAG, cns<
ing the agenda is prepared and distributed, background inf
ination is provided to participating members sufficiently in 1
vancc to allow time for written responses, and will arrange I
briefings and briefing aids TRADOC (ATCD-SE) will eva
ate new CIE concepts, and determine those applicable for SI
CIE initiation.
5-2. Composition
a. The CAG will consist of voting members in the grade:
Colonel, except for the senior enlisted representative, from II
following organizations and activities:
(1) TRADOC DCSCD (chairperson)
(2) Forces CommAnd (EORSCOM).
(3) AMC.
(4) FORSCOM senior female representative.
(5) Representative, Army Nuise Corps.
(6) Command Sergeant Major, TRADOC.
(7) US Army Health Services Command.
(8) U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR).
(9) Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA)
(10) U.S. Army Western Command (WESTCOM).
(II)ARNG.
(12) OCAR.





(4) AMC RDTE Center.
(5) US Aimy Academy of Health Sciences (AHS)
(6) USASPTAP.
•J) TIOII.
* (8) U.S. Army Human Engineering Laboratory (HE!





(13) Appropriate subject matter experts.









The title "special" is intended to highlight a
contrast - special operations are missions which fall outside
the training, tactics and organization of "conventional"
units, but which nevertheless must be accomplished in order to
achieve national objectives. According to United States
typology, specific needs for special operations are derived
from three general mission areas: Special Operations (SO),
Psychological Operations (PSYOP) , and Civil Affairs (CA)
.
Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) include strategic,
battlefield, and special activities used to change or influ-
ence the attitudes and behavior of foreign audiences. Civil
Affairs (CA) activities are conducted to establish and foster
favorable relationships and assist host nation forces in the
conduct of stabilizing programs of civil/military operations.
Special Operations are missions encompassed by the typology
below. [Ref. 36:p. 2]
2
.
Five Types of SO Missions
Officially designated Special Operations Forces (SOF)
have five types of missions:
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• Foreign Internal Defense. (This is "an interagency
activity to assist friendly nations in responding to
subversion, lawlessness, or insurgency." Special Opera-
tions Forces train, advise, and may assist military or
paramilitary forces in carrying out their mission. [Ref
.
36:p. 2])
• Unconventional Warfare. (Generally a long term military
or paramilitary operation, this mission includes guerilla
activities, evasion and escape, subversion, and sabotage.
It is low visibility, covert, and clandestine.)
• Special Reconnaissance. (Conducted as a low visibility,
covert, and clandestine operation, this type of mission
accomplishes target acquisition, area assessments, and
post strike reconnaissance.)
• Direct Action. (Direct Action is a "low visibility,
covert, and clandestine offensive operation of generally
short duration." [Ref. 36 :p. 2])
• Counterterrorism. (An offensive operation to prevent,
deter, and/or respond to terrorism.)
3 . Forces Assigned
Special operations combat forces assigned to USSOCOM
include: Army Special Forces ("Green Berets"), Army Rangers,
Army Special Operations Aviation units, Navy SEALs, Navy
Special Boat Units, and Air Force Special Operations units.
Additional non-combat arms forces include Army Civil Affairs
and PSYOP units . With the exception of Green Berets and
SEALS, however, all personnel assigned to SOF return to their
respective Service upon completion of their tour of duty in an




4 . Mission Characteristics
All five mission areas are essentially of a political-
military nature; each is usually affected more directly by
political considerations than conventional operations
.
Special operations may support conventional operations, or be
conducted independently during peace or hostilities when
conventional operations are inappropriate or infeasible.
Special operations are frequently of a high-risk nature and
are conducted generally in enemy-held, denied, or sensitive
territory by specially trained, equipped, and organized joint
Service forces in pursuit of national military, political,
economic, or psychological objectives. [Ref. 36 :p. 1] These
operations differ generally from conventional operations in
operational techniques, mode of employment, and dependence
upon operational intelligence and indigenous assets. The
nature of special operations demands that most intelligence be
provided in far greater detail and currency than for conven-
tional operations. [Ref. 36 :p. 1]
Special Operations, PSYOP, and CA forces are employed
across the spectrum of conflict. The role and mix of SOF,
PSYOP, and CA forces may vary significantly, depending on the
mission, environment, and available resources. In "High" and
"Medium" intensity conflicts, SOF, PSYOP, and CA forces
provide unique combat capabilities in support of conventional
forces and national security objectives, usually in a "force
multiplier" role. A few highly trained and specially equipped
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soldiers, when deployed at the right time and place, can
influence the outcome of a battle far out of proportion to
their numbers - thus "multiplying" the forces available to a
commander. [Ref. 36 :p. 1]
In Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) , indirect rather than
direct application of U.S. military power has often been more
effective. Special Operations, PSYOP, and CA forces provide
the primary US military capability in this operational
environment
.
B. EMERGING ROLES AND NEEDS
Attempts by DoD to field special operations forces have
often been unsuccessful. Historically, U.S. policy and
strategy have emphasized the need to prepare for war at the
upper end of the conflict spectrum. This emphasis has
generated a strategic and conventional force mix which has
successfully deterred such major conflicts, but has proven
much less capable of producing the same results at the lower
end of the conflict spectrum. [Ref. 36: pp. 1-2] Low intensity
conflict and peacetime environments are marked by a prolifera-
tion of events which adversely impact on U.S. national
security interests . These events - which include terrorism,
limited conventional wars, insurgencies, subversion, propagan-
da and disinformation, illicit narcotics trafficking - occur
under a different set of rules than conventional wars, and
134
require different weapons and tactics to deter or oppose their
activities. [Ref. 36:pp. 1-2]
There is growing evidence, furthermore, that the future
will see a increase in these type of events . Indicators of
this include the decline of superpower influence, increased
geographic displacement, increased economic interdependence,
and greater diffusion of technology and arms transfers. [Ref.
29 :p. 2] The aggregate of these environmental factors
suggests a new order of national and regional power competi-
tions with political and social uncertainty, and unpredictable
threats. [Ref. 29 :p. 2] There is also a high probability of
protracted, indirect confrontations between contending states
or groups. These LIC situations are expected to be more
prevalent during the remainder of the 20th century. In this
arena, U.S. policy recognizes that indirect applications of
U.S. military power are the most appropriate and cost-effec-
tive ways to achieve national goals. Military forces capable
of acting in proactive, preventive roles (e.g., planning,
advisory, assistance, support, counter-propaganda) and
conducting offensive operations when called upon, can serve as
a highly effective instrument of US foreign policy in support




SPECIAL OPERATIONS MATERIAL CHARACTERISTICS
Based on the missions and operational environment for
Special Operations, PSYOP, and CA forces, USSOCOM has estab-
lished the following general desired operational characteris-
tics for the development of SOF systems. [Ref 37]
Lightweight and micro-sized.
Low probability of intercept, low probability of detec-
tion, and jam resistant for all command, control, communi-
cations, and intelligence capabilities (C3I)
.
Reduced signature, low observable.
Highly lethal and destructive.
Low energy/power requirements supported by standardized
sources
.
Near real-time surveillance and intelligence and mission
planning.
Electronic warfare capable of disruption and deception of
the enemy
.
Modular, rugged, reliable, maintainable, and simplistic
with built-in survivability.
Operable in extreme cold/hot temperatures, and water and
pressure proof.
Compatible with conventional force systems
.
Transportable by aircraft, ship, and submarine, and
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